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FTC UNFAIRNESS: AN ESSAY
STEPHEN CALKTNSt
[Rjecently the Federal Trade Commission pointed out that
some of these entertainment companies have warned
parents that the material is inappropriate for children, and
then they turned around... and advertised that same adult
material directly to children. That is an outrage.'
Yes, but is it "unfair"?
So much black letter law is simple. Time and again, torts
students wonder how they could do poorly on a final examination
when they had successfully recited that negligence requires duty,
breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate cause, and damages. Almost
all of antitrust law is based on three simple statutory provisions:
Sherman Act Section 1 (agreements in restraint of trade are illegal);
Sherman Act Section 2 (monopolization and attempted
monopolization are illegal); and Clayton Act Section 7 (mergers
and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition are
illegal).2 It is easy to know the black letter law-yet knowing it
answers few hard questions (and earns students few points).
tProfessor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A. 1972, magna
cum laude, Yale University; J.D. 1975, cum laude, Harvard Law School. The
author was General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission from 1995 to
1997, but that agency obviously is not responsible for the views set forth herein.
Thanks to Lois Greisman forhervaluable insight and Shawn K. Ohl, Wayne
State University Law School class of 2001, for valuable research assistance.
1. Albert Gore, Statement of Vice President Albert Gore during the Third
Presidential Debate, (Oct. 17, 2000) available at
< http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/debatetextl0l700
c.htm>.
2. See generally Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and 2 (1999); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1999).
1935
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1935
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC, Commission) Act's
original prohibition of unfairness was similarly spare: the Act
"declared unlawful" "unfair methods of competition."3 Unhappy
with a cramped Supreme Court interpretation of this prohibition
in FTC v. Raladam Co.,4 Congress in 1938 supplemented this
language by declaring that "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" are
also "unlawful."'
This spare language then became more intricate. In 1980, the
Commission sought to make the general Congressional prohibition
more precise by issuing an unfairness policy statement.6 In 1983 it
added a deception policy statement. In 1994, Congress largely
codified the former by adding FTC Act Section 5(n):
The Commission shall have no authority... to declare
unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or
practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely
3. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified at 15
U.S.C. S 45(a) (1999)).
4. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
5.
Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 45(a)(1)
(1999)). The 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act also added S 12-17 to the Federal Trade
Commission Act. See id 5 4-5, 52 Stat. at 114 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
55 52-57 (1999)) (prohibiting the "false advertisement" of foods and drugs and
authorizing the FTC to seek preliminary injunctions thereof). Section 45(a)(1)
thus reads: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful.- 15 U.S.C. S 45(a)(1).
6. Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness
Jurisdiction, attached to Commission letter to Senators Danforth andFord (Dec.
17, 1980) [hereinafter "1980 Unfairness Statement"], reprinted in H. REP. No. 98-
156, at 33 (1983), 4 FTC TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,203 and In re
International Harvester Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070-76 (1984); see also Letter
from Commission to Senators Packwood and Kasten, reprinted in FTC
ANTIUST & TRADE REG. Rep. (BNA) No. 1055, at 568-70 (Mar. 5, 1982)
(reaffirming 1980 Policy Statement) [hereinafter 1982 Letter].
7. Letter from James C. Miller Ill to The Honorable John D. Dingell (Oct.
14, 1983), appended to In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984),
reprinted in 4 FTC TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,205.
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to cause [1] substantial injury to consumers which is [2] not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition. In determining whether an act or practice is
unfair, the Commission may consider established public
policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence.
Such public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis for such determination!
Section 5(n) added structure to the traditional generality of FTC
prohibitions.
When examined closely, however, Section 5(n)'s three-part test
added only an illusion of precision. Consumer law students get few
points for being able to recite that three-part test, and the FTC
staff, advocating a new case to Commissioners, should fare no
better. It is too easy to claim that the three tests are met.
Recent years have seen a very tentative increased focus on
consumer unfairness, changed in substantive emphasis and forum
of application. In spite of the ease with which a complaint can recite
the three-part test, the Commission has shied away from pleading
it; but noteworthy exceptions are starting to occur. Unfairness is
part of the Commission's historic mandate, reaffirmed by
Congress, and there is no reason why sound unfairness cases should
not be brought. It is nonetheless important for the Commission to
recognize how few questions are definitively answered by the three-
part test, and to continue to work to establish precedents that
advance legal clarity.
Two decades after the FTC issued its Unfairness Statement, this
essay appraises where we are. After providing some illustrations of
the existing uncertainty, the essay begins by looking backward,
sketching out the path that brought us here. It then reviews FTC
unfairness jurisprudence today, and how it has changed. Most FTC
unfairness cases challenge theft and the facilitation thereof. Other
8. FTC Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108 Stat. 1691,
1695 (codified at 15 U.S.C. S 45(n) (1999)).
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cases can be categorized as challenging the breaking or causing of
the breaking of other laws, the use of insufficient care, interference
with the exercise of consumer rights, and advertising that promotes
unsafe practices. The forum in which cases are brought also has
changed, as administrative adjudication has dramatically declined in
importance. In its observations and recommendations, the essay
revisits recent cases and suggests that the Commission place less
emphasis on simple injury and greater emphasis on balancing costs
and benefits, and go beyond the three-part test in its examination
of claimed unfairness (an illustration with possible considerations
is offered). The essay also emphasizes the importance of
administrative adjudication.
I. ILLUSTRATIONS
As an illustration of the indeterminacy of the three-part test,
imagine that the Commission has asked an FTC General Counsel
whether, as a matter of law, some practice is not "unfair."9 Imagine
further that in each case, a memorandum from the Bureau of
Consumer Protection (BCP) recites that the practice is likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers that cannot be reasonably
avoided and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits. In which
of the following cases should the General Counsel declare that as a
matter of law the practice is not unfair and cannot be challenged?
o An advertising campaign is conspicuously erotic, blatantly
using sex to sell.1" BCP argues that the campaign coarsens public
discourse and harms consumers, obviously cannot be avoided (it is
everywhere), and has no benefits.
o Guns are sold without protective devices. BCP argues that this
kills vulnerable consumers who obviously cannot avoid the harm,
9. See supra notes 5 & 8 and accompanying text.
10. Cf Lynne Duke, Advertising in a Bare Market, WASH. POST, Dec. 8,
2000, at C1 (discussing the Diamondcom advertising campaign and other
provocative advertising, available at <http://diamond.com/enterworld.asp?Sn-
8273318>).
1938
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and that lives outweigh any small expense."
* Violent and sexual movies, certain to earn an "R" rating, are
test-marketed to children too young to patronize the movies
without an accompanying parent or guardian.12 BCP argues that
this harms families because underage children will be attracted to
inappropriate movies, parents cannot prevent the harm (who can
control teenagers?), and there is no cost to testing movies only on
appropriate audiences.
e When one goes to certain web sites, a window pops open with
a promotion urging one to make a purchase, play a game, or
participate in a lottery. (Note: It would be unfair for the author of
this article to single out one of the many sites that do this.) BCP
argues that even if consumers can resist the blandishments of the
pop-up window, each consumer is harmed by a lessened viewing
experience as well as the expenditure of the time and mouse-control
to move and close the pop-up window. BCP argues that this wasted
time and effort may impose small costs on each consumer, but adds
up to massive costs in time and increased risk of carpal-tunnel
syndrom when multiplied by the potentially millions of hits each
day. 3 It cannot be avoided because the whole point is to make the
11. See, e.g., American Shooting Sports Council, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 429
Mass. 871 (1999) (unfair and deceptive under state law); see also Glenn Kaplan &
Chris Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net: Using State
Unfair Practices Laws To Make Handguns and Other Consumer Goods Safer, 17
YALEJ. ONREG. 253 (2000) (promoting reliance on state unfair practices laws).
12. See Movie Ratings (visited Mar. 31, 2001)
< http://www.mpaa.org/movieratings >. The Federal Trade Commission issued
a major report, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Childrern A Review of Self
Regulation and Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording &
Electronic Game Industries (Sept. 2000), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/vioreport.pdf>. The Commission
subsequently concludedthat Congress should encourage self-regulation or, failing
that, pass legislation; but that FTC enforcement actions would not be the best
means of addressingthe problems identified in the report. SeeLetter from Robert
Pitofsky, FTC Chairman, to Senator John McCain (Nov. 20,2000), rerintedat
< http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/11/violstudymccain.htm >.
13. See Ranking of Web Sites By Unique Visitors (visited Mar. 31, 2001)
<http://us.mediametrix.com/data/thetop.jsp> (several sites had more than 30
2000] 1939
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pop-up unavoidable, and there is no benefit to it.14
a Radio and television start to advertise distilled spirits." BCP
argues that, especially when shown on shows with a substantial
under-age audience,16 this is likely to harm consumers who
obviously cannot avoid the harm, and with no societal benefit at
all.
17
e Cigars do not have the same statutorily-required rotating
warnings as cigarettes. BCP alleges that cigar companies have "failed
to disclose that regular cigar smoking can cause several serious
adverse health conditions including, but not limited to, cancers of
the mouth (oral cavity), throat (esophagus and larynx), and lungs,""8
and that this is unfair because the three-part test is met.19
e A restaurant popular with teenagers permits smoking on its
outdoor patio. Although the law does not prohibit this, BCP argues
that second-hand smoke seriously injures pedestrians who pass the
restaurant and the still-developing lungs of teenagers unable to resist
million visitors a month).
14. This fact pattern is analyzed infra text accompanying notes 203-04.
15. See Patricia Winters Lauro, Cocktail Hour Returns to TV, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2000, at C I (radio and television-local and cable-advertising of distilled
spirits is increasing rapidly after years of self-imposed ban).
16. The distilled spirits industry currently restricts advertising to shows for
which at least half the audience is of drinking age. See id at C8.
17. In the Joe Camel case, In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9285, 1997
FTC LEXIS 1181 (complaint issued May 28, 1997; dismissed without prejudice
Jan. 26, 1999), the Commission alleged that RJ. Reynolds ran an advertising
campaign designed to make Camels more attractive to younger smokers, and
either (a) knew or should have known that the campaign would substantially
appeal to underage consumers, or (b) knew or should have known that by
targeting "'learning' smokers," "the Joe Camel campaign would cause many
children and adolescents . . . to smoke Camel cigarettes." R.j. Reynolds
Complaint, 1997 FTC LEXIS 118, at 6 & 10.
18. In re Swisher Int'l Inc., FTC Dkt. No. C-3964, 2000 FTC LEXIS 101
(Aug. 12, 2000) (consent order). Quoted language is in paragraph 4 of the
Complaint that accompanies the consent order. See id. at *101.
19. The Commission made this allegation and obtained a consent order
requiring rotating warnings in a group of cases announced at FTC Announces
Settlements Requiring Disclosure of Cigar Health Risks, Aug. 12, 2000,
< http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/06/cigars.htm >.
1940
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the peer pressure to patronize the restaurant, and that health
concerns outweigh almost any costs.2"
* An internet expert engages in "pagejacking" by making an
exact copy of a legitimate web site with one hidden change that
redirects surfers to its (illegitimate or unsavory) web site, and/or he
or she uses "mouse trapping" by incapacitating surfers' "back" and
"close" buttons such that surfers trying to exit are sent to undesired
web site after web site.2 BCP argues that the lost time,
inconvenience, and annoyance (consumers often need to shut down
computers) are a substantial injury that consumers cannot avoid,
and there is no benefit.'
* An information broker engages in "pretexting" by calling
financial institutions, pretending to be an account holder, obtaining
account information, and then selling this information.' BCP
alleges that pretexting is likely to cause substantial unavoidable
consumer injury not outweighed by countervailing benefits.2'
e A beer commercial depicts adults on a schooner, with some
of them, although not the pilot, drinking. BCP argues that this goes
20. Cf Maryland Village Endorses A Ban on Outdoor Smoking, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2000, at A9 (sixty jurisdictions nationwide have some kind of ban on
outdoor smoking).
21. See, e.g., Complaint, FTC v. Pereira (E.D. Va.) (filed Sept. 13, 1999),
available at < httpwww.ftc.gov/of/1999/9909/atariz.complaint.htm >. The case
is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 121-122 & 202-205.
22. See id. (challenge to pornography scam included unfairness count). The
FTC announced that it won a preliminary injunction, available at
<http-/www.ftc.gov/of/1999/9909/atarizpreliminaryinjunction.htm>. See
also press release, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9909/atariz.
htm>.
23. See infra text accompanying note 133.
24. This was the unfairness claim in FTC v. Rapp, Civ. No. 99-WM-783,
1999 LEXIS 112 (April 22, 1999) (stipulated consent judgment and final order
released June 27, 2000), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/
touchtoneorder.htm > (The Rapps were sued individually and doing business as
Touch Tone Information, Inc., and the case is referred to by both names.)
Commissioner Swindle dissented from the settlement. See
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/touchtoneswindle.htm>. The case is
discussed infra at notes 133-141 & 200-206.
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against the Coast Guard's recommendation not to have alcohol on
board" and that it is likely to cause substantial unavoidable
consumer injury not outweighed by any benefits.26
Some of those judgment calls are easy, some hard, and several
are ones for which there is no right answer. In very few, if any,
could one declare that Section 5(n)'s three-part test makes it clearly
unlawful for the FTC to proceed.
II. How WE GOT HERE
One is tempted to suggest that law-abiding businesses may want
guidance about what practices are "unfair." May an internet site
increase or direct consumer "hits" through pop-up windows?
Through page-jacking? At least in theory, businesses would benefit
were there an expert body to separate ihe legitimate from the
improper and, in a non-punitive way, to encourage businesses to
pursue the former. This was, of course, part of the instinct behind
the formation of the Federal Trade Commission."'
25. See <http://www.uscgboating.org/saf/safbui.asp >.
26. In In reBeck's North America, Inc., No. C-3859, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 40
(1999) (consent order), the Commission's complaint alleged (over Commissioner
Swindle's dissent) that it was "unfair" for a commercial to show young adults
without life jackets drinking while sitting on the edge of a schooner bow or
standing on a bowsprit. The case is discussed infra at notes 176-182.
27. The FTC is, if anything, over-studied, and this essay does not purport
to offer a thorough description of the origins and history of the agency; rather,
it highlights points of particular relevance. The same vigor with which the FTC
has been studied precludes the author from suggesting that all of his points are
novel; and, indeed, some have been made before. The legislative history of the
FTC is most conveniently collected in Volumes 5-8 of EARLW. KNTNER, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES (1982). Particularly useful works for present purposes include
KENNETH W. CLARKSON & TIMOTHY J. MURIs, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC
BEHAVIOR (1981); TIMOTHYJ. MURIS &J. HOWARD BEALES III, THE LIM1TS OF
1942
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Especially for those new to the debate, it is instructive briefly
to revisit how we arrived at our current understanding of
"unfairness" through the work of Congress, the courts, and the
Commission (and Congress's reaction thereto).
A. Congress
Early in 1914, President Wilson addressed a joint session of
Congress and made the case for an interstate trade commission.
Businesses, President Wilson said, "desire the advice, the definite
guidance and information which can be supplied by an
administrative body." 8 Bills were promptly introduced thereafter.
UNFAIRNESS UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT (1991); Neil W.
Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory ofA ntitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997); Neil W. Averitt,
The Meaning of 'Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225 (1981); Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness:
EmpathyandEconomicAnalysisat he FederaI Trade Commission, 68 B.U.L.REv.
349 (1988); Richard Craswell, Theldentification of UnfairActsandPractices by the
Federal Trade Commission, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 107 (1981); Ernest Geilhorn,
Trading Stamps, S&H, and the FTC's Unfairness Doctrine, 1983 DUKE L.J. 903
(1983); DavidA. Rice, Consumer Unfairnessat theFTC: Misadventures inLawand
Economics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.1 (1983); and Teresa Schwartz, Regulating
UnfairPractices Under the FTCAct: The Needfor a Legal Standard, 11 AKRON L.
REV. 1 (1977). See also STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
CH. 4 (1999); PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACtiCE
AND PROCEDURE C . 5 (1999).
28. Address by President Woodrow Wilson Before a Joint Session of
Congress on Additional Legislation for the Control of Trusts and Monopolies
(anuary 20, 1914, reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 27, at 374748:
Nothing hampers business like uncertainty. Nothing daunts or
discourages it like the necessity to take chances, to run the risk of falling
under the condemnation of the law before it can make sure just what
the law is .....
And the business men of the country desire something more than
that the menace of legal process in these matters be made explicit and
intelligible. They desire the advice, the definite guidance and
information which can be supplied by an administrative body, an
interstate trade commission.
20001 1943
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According to the key legislative (Senate) Report, legislators thought
that a new commission would be "of material aid to the business
world in building up a body of precedent in the matter of business
practices.""
This new commission's daunting assignment would be to
identify and eliminate methods of competition that were "unfair."
As conceded in its Report, the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce decided that "there were too many unfair practices to
define," so it "would, by a general declaration condemning unfair
practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices
were unfair."" The Conference Committee substituted "unfair
methods of competition" for the "unfair competition" that the bill
prohibited in order to make sure that courts did not give the
concept a crabbed reading limitedto common law understandings. 1
The House Managers returned from the Conference agreeing that
"([i]t is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices."32
29. S. REP. No. 63-597, at 10 (1914) ("the committee has aimed to provide
a body which will have sufficient power ancillary to the Department of Justice
to aid materially and practically in the enforcement of the Sherman law and to
aid the business public as well, and, incidentally, to build up a comprehensive
body of information for the use and advantage of the Government and the
business world").
30. Id. at 13 ("The committee was of the opinion that it would be better to
put in a general provision condemning unfair competition than to attempt to
define the numerous unfair practices, such as local price cutting, interlocking
directorates, and holding companies intended to restrain substantial
competition.")
31. See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1934); see also
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. at 648 ("Undoubtedlythe substituted phrase has abroader
meaning... "); cf Senate Consideration of H.R. 15613, S. 4160, reprinted in
KINTNER, supra note 27, at 4139 (Remarks of Senator Hollis) (recommending
changing "unfair competition" to "unfair or oppressive competition" or "unfair
methods of competition" to make sure that the statute not be given a narrow,
common law reading). Butcf Conference Consideration of H.R. 15613, reprinted
in KINTNER, supra note 27, at 4743 (remarks of Senator Stevens, one of the
House managers) (change was made "because we wanted to cover the specific act
which would be unfair, while the course of conduct by itself might be fair").
32. Conference Consideration of H.R. 15613, reprinted in KINTNER, supra
1944
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The Senate bill's author, Senator Newlands, defended both the
necessity of relying on the Commission to determine what was
unfair and the breadth of the concept of unfairness. In his speech
introducing the newly-reported bill, Senator Newlands explained
that "it would be utterly impossible for Congress to define the
numerous practices which constitute unfair competition and which
are against good morals in trade."33 Unfair competition "covers
every practice and method between competitors upon the part of
one against the other that is against public morals . .. or is an
offense for which a remedy lies either at law or in equity."3 When
Senator Sutherland objected that "public morals" was a "pretty
broad category," 5 Senator Newlands responded, "I think it is avery
good test. I think there are certain practices that shock the universal
conscience of mankind, and the general judgment upon the facts
themselves would be that such practices are unfair.""
note 27, at 4694:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even
if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited,
it would be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to
adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task. It
is also practically impossible to define unfair practices so that the
definition will fit business of every sort in every part of this country.
Whether competition is unfair or not generally depends upon the
surrounding circumstances of the particular case. What is harmful under
certain circumstances may be beneficial under different circumstances.
Id
33. Senate Consideration of H.R. 15613, S. 4160, reprinted in KINTNER,
supra note 27, at 3936 ("[l]t is utterly impossible for such a commission to define
all the practices that are against good morals in trade and that tend to give
competitors unfair advantage and dishonest advantage.'). Id
34. Id. at 3968 (going on to refer to "rebates, preferential contracts,
espionage, and the use of detectives, coercion, threats, intimidation, and the
bribery of employees').
35. Id. at 4414.
36. Id. Senator Newlands added:
I do not see much difficulty, when you appeal to the conscience of
mankind, in determining what is fair and what is unfair in business
practices....
2000] 1945
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Congress extensively debated the meaning of what was then
called "unfair competition" during its deliberations. Partisans often
agreed that the concept was broad, while disagreeing over whether
it was well defined or hopelessly (or unconstitutionally) vague.37 A
narrowing focus can be seen in the suggestions of advocates that
'[t]he object of section 5 is to prevent the creation or continuance
of monopoly through unfair methods,"" but those same advocates
seemed confident that, for instance, the Commission should
consider industrial espionage "unfair" even if a small firm employed
it.39 Representative Covington, a key House conferee, explained
that "the term may be said now to embrace those unjust, dishonest,
I claim, then, that that is a definite standard if the practice is against
good morals and against public morals and tends to the injury of a
competitor unfairly. Then, as to the numerous other things to which
an action of tort or an action in equity to restrain can lie, it seems to me
where those actions involve competition, where there would be a cause
of action by the individual against his competitor, almost all those
would be included in the term "unfair competition."
Id at 4414-15.
37. Conference Consideration of H.R. 15613, S. 4160, reprintedinYdNTNER,
supra note 27, at 4723; cf Remarks of Representative Covington (one of the
House Managers):
"I state quie candidly... that at the time this measure was first mooted
in the House I held to the opinion that 'unfair competition' or 'unfair
methods of competition,' . . . was so probably vague as to be
unenforceable. But after having given some months of study to the
subject I am able to say that there is in existence to-day a surprisingly
well-defined class of declarations by the courts .... All the conferees
were clear upon that.
Id.
38. Senate Consideration of H.R. 15613, S. 4160, rqrinted in KINTNER,
supra note 27, at 4141 (Remarks of Senator Hollis); see also Senate Report, supra
note 29, at 18-19 (Statement of the Managers on the part of the House, Report
of the Conference Committee) (It is now generally recognized that the only
effective means of establishing and maintaining monopoly, where there is no
control of a natural resource..., is the use of unfair competition. The most
certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to prevent unfair
competition.").
39. See Senate Consideration of H.R. 15613, S. 4160, reprinted in KNTNER,
supra note 37, at 4141, 4135, 4146 (Remarks of Senator Hollis).
1946
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and inequitable practices by which one seeks to destroy or injure
the business of a competitor."'° The Commission was entrusted
with making the concept workable and sustainable in court.
B. In the Courts
The Commission received a rude awakening in its first visit to
the Supreme Court. The Court would not abide by the
Commission's condemnation of an inoffensive tying arrangement
(jute bags were tied to steel ties used to bind bales of cotton) .41 "It
is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as a
matter of law" what are "unfair methods of competition,"42 the
Court wrote in words that would haunt the Commission in later
cases. "They are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore
regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by
deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy
because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition
or create monopoly." 3 Within a handful of years, the Court
rejected several other antitrust-related Commission orders as
involving practices not "opposed to good morals because
characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression."4"
Things took a turn for the better for the Commission in early
40. Conference Consideration of H.R. 15613, reprinted in KINTNER, supra
note 27, at 4726.
41. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
42. Id at 427.
43. Id. Justice Brandeis, with Justice Clarke, eloquently dissented and issued
a panegyric to Commission flexibility that later Courts found persuasive. Id. at
42942 (Brandeis,J., dissenting). Seealso Sperry &Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,
242 (1972) ("As we recently unanimously observed: 'Later cases of this Court.
. . have rejected the Gratz view and it is now recognized in line with the dissent
of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Gratz that the Commission has broad powers to
declare trade practices.unfair.' FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21
(1966).-).
44. Gratz, 253 U.S. at 427; see also FTC v. Raymond-Bros-Clark Co., 263
U.S. 565,572 (1924) (quoting Gratz); FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463,
475 (1923) (quoting Gratz); FTC v. Curtis Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923) (exclusive
agents).
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1924, one of two high-water marks in the history of Commission
"unfairness" jurisdiction. First, in FTCv. Algoma Lumber Co.,' the
Court, in a ringing opinion by Justice Cardozo, upheld the
Commission's condemnation of the use of a misleading trade name
(lumber from Western Yellow Pine was labeled "California White
Pine"). Consumers were entitled to have their preferences, however
irrational, honored-'
Dealers and manufacturers are prejudiced when orders that
would have come to them if the lumber had been rightly
named, are diverted to others whose methods are less
scrupulous .... The careless and the unscrupulous must rise
to the standards of the scrupulous and diligent. The
Comm'n was not organized to drag the standards down.4'
Second, in Justice Stone's opinion for the Court in FTC v. R.F.
Keppel & Bro., Inc.,4 the Commission's "unfairness" mandate really
blossomed. The case involved the Commission's campaign against
the wide-spread use of "break and take" packages of inexpensive
candy that used an element of lottery as a marketing gimmick.49
The court of appeals had ruled that this was not an unfair way to
compete, because the technique involved no "deception, fraud, or
bad faith"' and it was available for use by any merchant."' The
Supreme Court disagreed:
[A] trader may not, by pursuing a dishonest practice, force
his competitors to choose between its adoption or the loss
45. 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
46. See id. at 78.
47. IdL at 78-79. The Court reaffirmed Algoma Lumber's principle, that
misleading advertising is harmful to competition, only two years ago. See
California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 n.9 (1999).
48. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
49. See id. at 306-08.
50. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1933), rev'd,
291 U.S. 304 (1934).
51. See id.
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of their trade. A method of competition which casts upon
one's competitors the burden of the loss of business unless
they will descend to a practice which they are under a
powerful moral compulsion not to adopt, even though it is
not criminal, was thought to involve the kind of unfairness
at which the statute was aimed. 2
The Commission was not just engaged in "censoring the morals of
business men;" rather, it was attacking a practice that "exploit[s]
consumers, children, who are unable to protect themselves" and
was widely condemned as "contrary to public policy." 3 Congress
had deliberately chosen a broad, flexible phrase "'the meaning and
application of which must be arrived at by what this Court
elsewhere has called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion."' The Commission's "duty," in the felicitous words
with which Judge Learned Hand applied Keppel, was "to discover
and make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which
the conscience of the community may progressively develop." 5
One small glitch remained. In 1931, the Court in Ra/adam had
found that an unsavory practice could be "unfair" only if it
"substantially injured or tended thus to injure the business of any
competitor or of competitors generally."5" Because it appeared that
the quack obesity cure at issue in Raladam adversely affected no
competitor, the Commission could not interveneY
Congress removed the Raladam glitch in 1938 by passing the
52. Keppd, 291 U.S. at 313.
53.Id.
54. Id. at 312 (quoting FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)).
55. FTC v. Standard Education Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692,696 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd
in part on other grounds 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937) (upholding Commission
objection to other "practices contrary to decent business standards").
56. Raladam, 283 U.S. at 652-53. The Court observed that in the
Congressional debate "the necessity of curbing those whose unfair methods
threatened to drive their competitors out of business was constantly
emphasized." Id. at 650.
57. See id. at 654.
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Wheeler-Lea amendments."8 The amendments made "[u]nfair or
deceptive acts or practices" as well as "unfair methods of
competition" unlawful.5 9 The change was more jurisdictional than
substantive: Congress merely empowered the Commission to
proceed regardless whether the unfair act injured a competitor.'
Many viewed the principal consequence as saving the Commission
the time and expense of proving the injury to a competitor or
competition that the Commission almost always could establish.61
C. The Commission (and Congress's Reaction) -
True to its understanding of the impact of the Wheeler-Lea
amendments, the Commission continued routinely to charge
respondents with engaging in both unfair or deceptive acts or
practices and unfair methods of competition.' Although it
58. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111.
59. 15 U.S.C.A. 5 45(a)(1) (West 1997). Each is unlawful only if it is in or
affecting commerce. See id
60. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1613, at 3 (1987) reprintedinKNTNER, supra note
27, at 4879; seealso S. REP.No. 75-221, at 2-3 (1937), reprinted in KINTNER, supra
note 27, at 4873-74.
61. House Consideration of S. 1077, reprinted in KINTNFR supra note 27, at
4879. There is some suggestion that an "act" was seen as something less
systematic than a "method." S. REP. No. 75-221, at 3-4, reprinted in KJNTNER,
supra note 27, at 4875. But that was not the principal thrust of the amendment.
Cf id. at 2, reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 27, at 4874-75 ("[W]here it is not
a question of a purely private controversy, and where the acts and practices are
unfair or deceptive to the public generally, they should be stopped regardless of
their effect upon competitors. This is the sole purpose and effect of the chief
amendment of section 5.") See id. at 2. Senator Wheeler further remarked-
The present act makes unlawful 'unfair methods of competition,' and
the Supreme Court has held that the Commission loses jurisdiction of
a case where an actual or potential competitor is not involved. This
amendment makes the consumer who may be injured by an unfair trade
practice of equal concern before the law with the merchant injured by
the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.
83 CONG. REC. 3252, 3255 (remarks of Sen. Wheeler) reprinted in KINTNER,
supra note 27, at 4924.
62. Seee.g., In reHousehold SewingMachine Co., 76 F.T.C. 207 (1969) ("bait
1950
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challenged a wide variety of practices,63 the first systematic
examination of "unfairness" did not occur until 1964, when the
commission issued its Cigarette Advertising Rule Statement of Basis
and Purpose." Reviewing a long list of marketing practices that it
had forbidden as "unfair," the Commission drew from those
examples three factors that determine whether an act or practice is
unfair: public policy, morality and ethics, and "substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)."65
and switch" tactics are unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts and practices). The Commission was inconsistent in its pleading, and there
are counter-examples. The Cigarette Rule's Statement of Basis and Purpose lists
a series of "unfairness" cases focused on consumers, several of which, but not a
majority, featured this double pleading. See infra note 64.
63. Cf FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 353-54 & n.4 (1941)
(noting that Congress designed Section 5 "as a flexible concept with evolving
content," the Court observed that the Commission's 1939 annual report "lists as
'unfair competition' thirty-one diverse types of business practices which run the
gamut from bribing employees of prospective customers to selling below cost for
hindering competition").
64. See Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair
or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8355-74 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. 408
(2000)).
65. Ia at 8355:
No enumeration of examples can define the outer limits of the
Commission's authority to proscribe unfair acts or practices, but the
examples should help to indicate the breadth and flexibility of the
concept of unfair acts or practices and to suggest the factors that
determine whether a particular act or practice should be forbidden on
this ground. These factors are as follows: (1) whether the practice,
without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful,
offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common
law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the
penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept
of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or
competitors or other businessmen). If all three factors are present, the
challenged conduct will surely violate Section 5 even if there is no
specific precedent for proscribing it. The wide variety of decisions
interpreting the elusive concept of unfairness at least makes clear that
a method of selling violates Section 5 if it is exploitive or inequitable
2000] 1951
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The Cigarette Rule Statement's factors acquired talismanic
status when the Supreme Court cited them with apparent approval
in FTC v. Spery & Hutchinson Co.," the second high-water mark
for Commission unfairness. This FTC defeat offered the siren
clause:
[T]he Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate
excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against
the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of
fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values
beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed
in the spirit of the antitrust laws.'
(The FTC lost because the Commission, in its opinion, had failed
to avail itself of this power, but had instead relied on antitrust-
related notions of competitive effect that would not sustain its
order.)"
Exhilarated by the heady aroma of unfairness thinking, the
Commission promptly brought a series of "unfairness" cases.69 It
and if, in addition to being morally objectionable, it is seriously
detrimental to consumers or others. Beyond this, it is difficult to
generalize.
In the last analysis, the Commission's responsibility in this area is
to enforce a sense of basic fairness in business conduct. For while
Section 5 "does not authorize regulation which has no purpose other
than * * * censoring the morals of business men" (F.T.C. v. R. F.
Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304,313 (1934)), the Commission cannot
shirk the difficult task of defining and preventing those breaches of the
principles of fair dealing that cause substantial and unjustifiable public
injury.
Id
66. 405 U.s. 233 (1972).
67. Id at 244.
68. See id. at 247-50.
69. See, e.g., In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (Kirkpatrick,
Commissioner) (an important advertising substantiation opinion). The FTC
noted that "[u]nfairness is potentially a dynamic analytical tool capable of a
progressive, evolving application which can keep pace with a rapidly changing
1952
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won some important appellate decisions,7 and then, in a classic
example of suffering immensely from having dreams fulfilled, it
persuaded Congress formally to authorize rule-making in the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act."' S&Hemboldenedthe Commission to challenge
practices as "unfair"; the Magnuson-Moss Act and accompanying
enthusiasm for rule-making stimulated the agency to make
industry-wide rule-making its weapon of choice 7
The Commission redirected its efforts away from case-by-case
adjudication to the crafting of sweeping rules with the force of
law.' Before long, the agency devoted more than half of its
consumer protection resources to rule-making. The combination of
unfairness and rule-making was deadly: the over-stimulated
economy.' Id (footnote omitted); see also In re Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp.,
89 F.T.C. 82 (1977) (consent order) (advertising vitamins to children is unfair);
In re Genesco, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 451 (1977) (unfair to transfer substantial consumer
credit balances to corporation without informing consumers); In re Philip
Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16(1973) (consent order) (including razor blades in home-
delivered newspapers unfair). Pfizer, Inc., drew substantially on the path-breaking
opinion for the Commission by Commissioner Elman in In re All-State
Industries, Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465 (1969), affd 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970). The
Commission in All-State held that it was unfair not to inform consumers of the
practice of routinely assigning notes of indebtedness to third parties against
whom claims and defenses may not be available. See idL at 495-97. The
Commission wrote of its "dynamic" responsibility "to create a new body of
law-a law of unfair trade practices adapted to the diverse and changing needs of
a complex and evolving competitive system." Id at 491.
70. See, eg., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976) (suing
consumers in inconvenient forums is unfair); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1976) (failure to disclose anticipated use of tax information in loan
solicitations was an unfair method of competition).
71. Magnum-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Comm. Improvement Act of
1975, Pub. L. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183. A good account is given in American
Financial Services Assoc. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957,967 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
72. Seeid
73. See 41 Fed. Reg. 3322 (1976) ("The Federal Trade Commission intends
to reconsider and, if appropriate, promulgate into Trade Regulation Rules the
principles of consumer protection law which it has developed in the course of
deciding individual cases and accepting individual consent agreements.").
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Commission reached too far; the press and business interests
pilloried the agency as the "National Nanny" after it proposed a
rule regulating advertising to children;74 Congress passed legislation
cutting back on the FTC's jurisdiction over a wide swath of the
economy and preventing "unfaimess"-based regulation of
commercial advertising,75 and the Commission strategically (and
hastily) retreated.'
The upshot was that the Commission issued its December 17,
1980, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the
Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction.' The Commission inverted the
order of the Cigarette Statement's factors, putting the
immoral/unethical consideration last, noting that the agency had
never relied solely on this factor, and promising to act only on the
basis of the other two factors in the future.' The commission also
74. See, e.g., Caswell 0. Hobbs, Unfairness at theFTC-TheLegacy ofS&H, 47
ANTITRUST LJ. 1023 (1978); see also 140 CONG. REC. H6162, H6165, (daily ed.
July 25, 1994) (remarks of Representative Oxley) ("During the Carter
Administration, the FTC went amok. By endeavoring to categorize huge
expanses of American advertising as unfair, the agency produced a bipartisan
backlash ....").
75. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-
252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
76. In his Spring 1980 comments to the ABA Antitrust Section, FTC
Chairman Michael Pertschuk admitted having made mistakes and discussed the
"bleak side" of the controversies that had weakened morale and hurt recruiting.
See Panel Discussion: Interview with Michael Pertscmuk, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, 49 ANTTRUST L.J. 1079 (1980).
77. See Commission Letter to Senators Danforth and Ford, supra note 6. The
letter did not discuss the Commission's jurisdiction over "unfair methods of
competition" except in a footnote that stated:
In fulfilling its competition or antitrust mission the
Commission looks to the purposes, policies, and spirit of the
other antitrust laws and the FTC Act to determine whether a
practice affecting competition or competitors is unfair. In
making this determination the Commission is guided by the
extensive legislative histories of those statutes and a
considerable body of antitrust case law.




de-emphasized "Public policy," the second factor in both
statements. 9 It was to be relied on heavily only where widely
shared and where "declared or embodied in formal sources."s'
Primacy was given to injury (now labeled consumer injury), which
itself was subject to a three-part test: "It must be substantial; it must
not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition that the practice produces; and it must be an injury
that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.""
With criticism continuing (and a new Chairman in office), in
spring 1982 the Commission, with one dissent, advised Congress
that it viewed as appropriate the statutory codification of its
unfairness standards. In fall 1983, the Commission issued a policy
statement carefully setting out its approach to deception.' In spite
of this, the agency went without authorization from 1980 (when it
was authorized for two years) until 1994.84 Also starting in 1980,
Congress subjected the Commission to continuing prohibitions on
the issuance of unfair advertising rules.' Finally, in the 103d
Congress, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
reported and the House passed a bill that ended the limitation on
commercial advertising rulemaking (and left unfairness authority
unaffected);" the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation reported and the Senate passed a bill that prohibited
commercial advertising "unfairness" rule-making and codified the
Commission's existing "unfairness" standards as reflected in its 1980
79. See id
80. Id at 1076.
81. Id at 1073.
82. See Letter from FTC Chairman James C. Miller IT to Senators
Packwood and Kasten (Mar. 11, 1982) (former Chairman Pertshuk dissented
from this part of the letter).
83. See Letter from James C. Miller III to the Hon. John D. Dingell, supra
note 7.
84. See H.R REP. No. 103-128 (June 17, 1993) (noting the hiatus).
85. See id
86. See id See also H.R. 2243, 103d Cong. (1993), 139 CONG. REC. H 3844
(1993).
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and 1982 letters" (the Commission testified that this codification
was "unnecessary" but unobjectionable);88 and the Conference
87. See S. Res. 1179, 103d Cong., 139 CONG. REC. 12255 (1993) (enacted); S.
REP. No. 103-130, at 12-13:
This section amends section 5 of the FTC Act to add a new subsection
limiting the FTC's authority over "unfair acts or practices" to acts or
practices that cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition. This limitation applies both to adjudications under section
5 and rulemakings under section 18.... This section is intended to
codify, as a statutory limitation on unfair acts or practices, the
principles of the FTC's December 17, 1980, policy statement on
unfairness, reaffirmed by a letter from the FTC dated March 5, 1982.
Since the FTC's policy statement itself is based on the FTC's decided
cases and rules, this section codifies existing law. The incorporation of
these criteria should enable the FTC to proceed in its development of
the law of unfairness with a firm grounding in the precedents decided
under this authority, and consistent with the approach of the FTC and
the courts in the past. The Committee believes that this codification is
necessary in order to provide the FTC, its staff, regulated business, and
reviewing courts greater guidance on the meaning of unfairness and to
prevent a future FTC from abandoning the principles of the December
17, 1980, and March 5, 1982, letters.... Consumer injury may be
"substantial" under this section if a relatively small harm is inflicted on
a large number of consumers or if a greater harm is inflicted on a
relatively small number of consumers. In accordance with the FTCs
December 17, 1980, letter, substintial injury is not intended to
encompass merely trivial or speculative harm. In most cases, substantial
injury would involve monetary or economic harm or unwarranted
health and safety risks. Emotional impact and more subjective types of
harm alone are not intended to make an injury unfair.. .. In
determining whether a substantial consumer injury is outweighed by
the countervailing benefits of a practice, the Committee does not intend
that the FTC quantify the detrimental and beneficial effects of the
practice in every case. In many instances, such a numerical benefit-cost
analysis would be unnecessary; in other cases, it may be impossible.
This section would require, however, that the FTC carefully evaluate
the benefits and costs of each exercise of its unfairness authority,
gathering and considering reasonably available evidence.
Id
88. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Senate
1956
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Committee agreed to a bill that became law.' Congress dropped
the interference with commercial advertising rule-making and
supplemented the Senate's language concerning consumer
unfairness with the cautionary words about excessive reliance on
public policy that now appear as the last two sentences of FTC Act
Section 5(n)Y0 The import of the provision remained unchanged,
however: to codify FTC practice."
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. at 23 (1993)
(statement of Janet D. Steiger, chairman, Federal Trade Commission) ("Section
10, which defines unfair acts or practices, is taken from the criteria articulated in
the Commission's Policy Statement on Unfairness [hereinafter Unfairness
Statement] and from subsequent Commission case law on unfairness in which
the Unfairness Statement has been interpreted and applied. Because the definition
in the bill is taken from the definition in Commission policy and case law,
Section 10 is unnecessary, but for the same reason, the Commission does not
oppose Section 10.") (footnotes omitted).
89. See CONF. REF. NO. H.R. 103-617 (1994).
90. See id.; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
91. Cf 140 CONG. REC. S11316, S11317 (1994) (remarks of Senate Manager
Senator Gorton) ("Fortunately, the conferees were able to reach a compromise
by removing the absolute ban while retaining the definition of unfairness that
the FTC has been using since it promulgated a policy statement on unfairness in
1980. We were also able to reach an acceptable middle ground on the role which
public policy should play in determining unfairness."); 140 CONG. REC. H6162,
daily ed. (July 25, 1994) (remarks of House Manager Representative Swift)
("[Tihe report includes a definition of unfair acts or practices that closely
parallels the 1980 policy statement of the Commission on the scope of the FTC's
consumer unfairness jurisdiction. What the report does not include is a
prohibition on rulemakings based upon the FTC's unfairness authority."); 140
CONG. REC. H6164, daily ed. (remarks of House Manager Representative
Dingell) ("The compromise is premised on the 1980 policy statement of the FTC
on unfairness, as applied and interpreted by the Commission since 1980. The
compromise clearly allows the FTC to consider public policies in making a
determination of unfairness."); 140 CONG. REC. H6165, daily ed. (remarks of
House Manager Representative T.J. Manton) ("The conference report ends the
unfairness rulemaking ban, but includes a precise and narrowly defined
definition of unfairness.... The definition is derived from the 1980 policy
statement of the Commission and a 1982 letter from the Commission regarding
unfairness. The agreement also allows the Commission to consider public
policies as evidence in determining whether an act is unfair .... The conference
agreement clearly states that such public policy considerations may not serve as
200 1957
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FTC practice was not actually very well established when
Congress legislated. The Commission testified that it had applied
its 1980 Unfairness Statement in only 16 cases:92 five adjudicated
orders,93 one case reviewing a trade regulation rule,94 and ten
consent orders or district court complaints.95 Although, for
an independent basis for a finding of unfairness."). The Conference Report
merely reports the change.
92. See Letter from Federal Trade Commission to Hon. John D. Dingell
(June 4, 1983) (responding to questions from Honorable John D. Dingell), in
HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Transportation and HazardousMateria4s of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 312-13, 343-44 (1993).
93. See In re Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 108 F.T.C. 263 (1986)
(company's unilateral modification of its contracts with consumers was
determined to be unfair); Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985)
(Commission found company's land sale practices unfair based on exploitative
sales practices and non-negotiable forfeiture clauses similar to one in the Horizon
and Amrep cases), affd, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986); International Harvester
Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (tractor manufacturer's failure to adequately disclose the
safety risk of "fuel geysering" in its tractors was deemed unfair); Amrep Corp.,
102 F.T.C. 1362 (1983) (Commission found land sales company's sales practices
unfair based on exploitative sales practices and non-negotiable forfeiture clauses
similar to one in the Horizon case), affld, 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985); Horizon
Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464 (1981) (Commission determined that company's land sales
contracts were adhesive in nature and unfair because, among other things, they
contained anon-negotiable forfeiture clause which was not clearly brought to the
attention of consumers and, therefore, could not be avoided by consumers.) (all
parentheticals by Commission).
94. SeeA mericanFinancialServs., 767 F.2d at 957 (upholding Credit Practices
Rule).
95. Seeln re Fone Telecommunications, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 426 (1993) (consent
order) (unfair to induce children to place phone calls, and thereby incur a charge,
without providing a reasonable means for those responsible for paying for the
charges to exercise control over the transaction); Phone Programs, Inc., 115
F.T.C. 977 (1992) (consent order) (unfair to induce children to place phone calls,
and thereby incur a charge, without providing a reasonable means for those
responsible for paying for the charges to exercise control over the transaction);
Audio Communications, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 414 (1991) (consent order) (unfair to
induce children to place phone calls, and thereby incur a charge, without
providing a reasonable means for those responsible for paying for the charges to
exercise control over the transaction); Teleline Inc., 114 F.T.C. 399 (1991)
(consent order) (unfair to induce children to place phone calls, and thereby incur
1958
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unexplained reasons (probably simple oversight), this recitation
omitted several trade regulation rules9' and ten consent orders,97 the
a charge, without providing a reasonable means for those responsible for paying
for the charges to exercise control over the transaction); Credi-Care, Inc., Civ.
No. 920-8000 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (consent judgment) (company's unfair billing
practices which made consumers unknowingly delinquent with their payments
deemed unfair), reportedat < http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawnF93/credi-car5.
htm>; Discount Travel Services, Inc., 88-113-CIV-FWC-15C (M.D. Fla. 1988)
(Commission challenged unauthorized billing on credit cards as unfair);
Creditcard Travel Services, Inc., of New York, No. 87C9443 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(Commission challenged company's unauthorized billing on credit cards and
refusal to honor consumers' cancellation requests as unfair); C & D Electronics,
Inc., 109 F.T.C. 72 (1987) (consent agreement) (complaint alleged that the sale
of pirate cable television decoders to unauthorized users was unfair because it
resulted in higher prices for cable services to consumers and lost municipal
revenue from franchisee fees); J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 109 F.T.C. 54 (1987)
(consent agreement) (unfair to bring debt collection lawsuits in judicial forums
distant from where the consumer lives or where the contractual agreement was
signed); Federal Sterling Galleries, Inc., Civ. 87-2072 PHX CAM (D. Ariz. 1987)
(Commission challenged unauthorized billing on credit cards as unfair) (all
parentheticals by Commission).
96. See Harry and Bryant Co. v. F.T.C., 726 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1984)
(upholding Funeral Rule); Trade Regulation Rule ConcerningMail or Telephone
Order Merchandise Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 58
Fed. Reg. 49096 (1993); Opthalmic Practice Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose,
54 Fed. Reg. 10285 (1989); Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Sale of Used
Motor Vehicles, Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49
Fed. Reg. 45692 (1984). The Commission's analysis of one amended rule applied
the 1980 Letter to the original rule-making record and concluded that the new
standards had been satisfied. See Amendment to Trade Regulation Rule
Concerning Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel and Certain Piece Goods,
48 Fed. Reg. 22733 (1983).
97. Seeln re Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., No. C-3413 (1993) (consent order)
(unfair to process credit card transactions for several years when Respondent
knew or should have known the card issuer was violating the law, by, for
instance, billing customers after they had cancelled memberships); American
Family Publishers, 116 F.T.C. 66 (1993) (consent order) (creditor's assisting,
acting in concert with, or knowingly approving its debt collection agencies'
sending unlawful collection material is unfair); Tower Loan of Mississippi,115
F.T.C. 140 (1992) (consent order) (unfair to require borrowers to execute false
declaration that credit insurance was voluntarily chosen); Budget Rent A Car
Corp., 113 F.T.C. 1109 (1990) (consent order) (unfair not to disclose to renters
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number remains small. Only three federal appellate cases (none by
the Supreme Court) have addressed the Commission's Unfairness
Statement."
I. FTC UNFAmNEss JURISPRUDENCE TODAY
The situation is little different today. The Supreme Court has
not spoken. No new court of appeals has weighed in. No opinion
of the Commission addresses FTC Act Section 5(n)." The
Commission has not based any new Trade Regulation Rule on the
unfairness authority. New initiatives and new thinking are reflected
only in consent orders and complaints (a couple of which have led
to District Court decisions).
In part due to the dearth of binding precedent, the law of FTC
unfairness remains indeterminate. This is not surprising. Observers
recognized that the 1980 Unfairness Statement, while a significant
analytic contribution, failed to draw bright lines delineating unfair
that rental company did not promptly inspect cars subject to recall); Consumer
Direct, Inc., 113 F.T.C. 923 (1990) (consent order) (unfair not to disclose that
exercise device could break and injure user); Jeep Eagle Corp., 113 F.T.C. 792
(1990) (consent order) (unfair to breach warranties by failing to effect successful
repairs reasonably promptly); International Masters Publishers Inc., 109 F.T.C.
9 (1987) (consent order) (unfair for mail order seller of recipe cards to represent
that it would honor cancellation requests and permit cards to be returned (to
avoid payment), and then not to do so); Saab-Scania of America, Inc., 107 F.T.C.
410 (1986) (consent order) (complaint, 5) (automobile manufacturer's applying
paint so that it later blisters and peels "in a significant number of instances,"
without disclosing this to consumers, is unfair); Sun Refining & Marketing Co.,
104 F.T.C. 578 (1984) (consent order) (failing to honor a lifetime automotive
battery warranty is unfair); Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 102 F.T.C 1356
(1983) (consent order) (unfair to effect a merger of mortgage firms so
ineffectually that insurance payments are not timely paid).
98. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988);
American Financial Services Ass'n., 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Harry and
Bryant Co., 726 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1984).
99. The initial decision in In re Griffin Systems, Inc., 117 F.T.C. 515 (1994),
found that the respondent had engaged in an unfair act or practice, but this
finding was not challenged before the Commission. See id-
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practices,' °° and codification of those standards, even as elucidated
by occasional application during ensuing years, was unlikely
suddenly to bring clarity. Instead, it brought merely the illusion of
clarity. What is clear, however, is that FTC unfairness
jurisprudence has nonetheless changed substantively and
procedurally.
A. The Changed FTC Unfairness Juriprdnce- Substance
FTC unfairness jurisprudence-if one can call complaints and
consent orders jurisprudence-has changed. A traditional listing of
unfair acts or practices would include four categories: (1) coercive
or high-pressure selling, (2) withholding material information, (3)
unsubstantiated claims, and (4) post-purchase rights andremedies.'0 '
The Commission addressed wrongdoings in these categories in rule-
makings and administrative adjudication, often litigated to a final
decision.0 2
Even by the time Congress enacted FTC Act Section 5(n) in
1994, this had changed. Of the 16 Commission-reported cases in
which the agency had applied its 1980 Unfairness Statement, 10 3 not
one involved unsubstantiated claims; for two decades, advertising
substantiation cases have been brought under the Commission's
more robust "deception" authority. Only one case, International
Harvester, involved failure to give information (an adequate
warning), and that was in essence a products liability case in which
the Commission elected not to issue any corrective remedy."°
Several cases relate to post-purchase rights and remedies: Orkin
100. See American Financial ServicesAss'n., 767 F.2d at 980 & n. 16 (citing
both Gellhorn and Rice, supra note 30).
101. See PETER C. WARD, supra note 27 (crediting Craswell and Averitt,
supra note 27).
102. See, eg., In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984) (leading
substantiation case).
103. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
104. See International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 949. Several other
Commission cases had involved issues of disclosure and lack of adequate care, but
the Commission omitted these from its report. See supra note 96.
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challenged a seller's unilateral breach of contracts; l"5 American
Financial Services upheld the credit practices rule;"6 J. C. Penney
challenged suing consumers in inconvenient districts;107 and land
sales cases objecting to non-negotiable forfeiture clauses and to pre-
and post-purchase misrepresentations that induced consumers to
enter into and then continue paying on contracts."0 8 The three land
sales cases all featured high-pressure selling practices, and at least
one made this the focus of the decision. 1 9 However, more than half
of the 16 cases fell into new categories. Four were "900-number"
cases, typified by the television ads urging children to pick up the
telephone and call Santa Claus at a certain 900 number (without
mentioning the large expense involved). 0 Five cases challenged
practices that amounted to theft or the facilitating thereof.'
Modem Commission unfairness cases fall into five categories:
(1) theft and the facilitation thereof (clearly the leading category);
(2) breaking or causing the breaking of other laws; (3) using
insufficient care; (4) interfering with the exercise of consumer
rights; and (5) advertising that promotes unsafe practices. Each
category is considered in turn.
1. Theft and the Facilitation Thereof
The five Commission-identified cases challenging theft, or the
facilitation thereof, established a pattern. Three challenged
105. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. at 263.
106. See American Fin. Servs. Assoc., 767 F.2d at 957.
107. SeeJ.C. Penney Co., 109 F.T.C. at 54.
108. SeeAmrep Corp., 102 F.T.C. at 1362 (forfeiture clause); Horizon Corp.,
97 F.T.C. at 464 (forfeiture clause); Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. at 7
(misrepresentations).
109. See supra note 93.
110. See Fone Telecommunications, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 426 (1993) (consent
order); Phone Programs, Inc., 115 F.T.C. 977 (1992) (consent order); Audio
Communications, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 414 (1991) (consent order); Teleline Inc., 114
F.T.C. 399 (1991) (consent order).
111. See infra part Im.A.1.
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unauthorized billing of credit cards.' The respondent in another
case, FTCv. Credi-Care Inc.,"' allegedly forced consumers to send
payment checks on a round-a-bout route that caused 90 per cent of
consumers to be in arrears, and subject to penalties, right from the
start."' Most interesting was C&D Electronics, Inc.11 The
Commission complained of Respondent's sale of cable system
decoders and similar devices designed to permit unauthorized
viewing of cable television signals. This satisfied the three-part test,
the Complaint alleged, because lost revenues caused legitimate
subscribers to pay higher prices or receive reduced services, and
harmed all consumers by reducing franchise fees."' Commissioner
Azcuenaga protested that any injury really flowed from the
unlawful acts of the purchasers of decoders, and the majority was
"embark[ing] on a course of social engineering that brings a radical
new meaning to the concept of consumer protection."""
This emphasis on theft and its facilitation has continued since
1994; more cases fit within this category than any other. Many are
112. See F.T.C.v. Credit Card Travel Services, Inc., No. 87 C 9443 (N.D. Ill.
April 14, 1999) (consent order) (refusing to pay refunds and refusing to honor
cancellation requests and instead billing for additional service is unfair), press
releases available at < http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F89/bankcard2.txt >
(visited Mar. 31, 2001); <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F87/bankcarL
txt> (visited Mar. 31, 2001); FTC v. Federal Sterling Galleries Inc., Civ. No.
CIV-87-2072 PHX CAM (D. Az. 1988) (preliminary injunction announced
Feb. 29, 1988), press releases available at < http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/
F87/sterling.txt> (visitedMar. 31,2001); <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/
F88/sterlingpi.txt> (visited Mar. 31,2001); FTC v. Travel World International,
Civ. No. 88-113-CIV-FTM-15C (M.D. Fla. 1989), stipulated injunction filed
Nov. 2,1989, reported at < http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F89/travelwld2.
txt> (visitedMar. 31, 2001).
113. Civ. No. 920 8000 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (consent judgment), press release
available at < http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F93/credi-car5.htm >.
114. See id
115. 109 FTC 72 (1987) (consent order), discussed further infra text
accompanying note 210.
116. See id
117. Id. at 78 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga).
Commissioner Azcuenaga also noted that Congress had already addressed the
unauthorized use of decoders through legislation. See id
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straightforward;"' others more intriguing."9 The FTC won a
preliminary injunction against a web site that required a credit card
number for a purportedly free tour and then surreptitiously ended
the free tour and began unauthorized charging.12 In the
"pagejacking"/"mouse trapping" case,' the defendant succeeded in
diverting web surfers to its unsavory sites aid then kidnapping
them by sending them to site after site despite their best efforts to
118. See FTC v. J.K. Publications, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(unauthorized debiting of bank accounts unfair); FTC v. Windward Marketing,
Ltd., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17114 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (same); FTC v. Diversified
Marketing Service Corp., Civ. No. 96-0388M (E.D. Okla. 1996) (consent
judgment), see press releases at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/9603/wind.
htm> (visited Mar. 31, 2001) and <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/9610/
diverse2.htm > (visited Mar. 21, 2001); FTC v. Bally's Health & Tennis Corp.,
Civ. No. 94-0821 (D.D.C. April 14, 1994) (proposed consent order), see press
release at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F95/baUy-health.htm> (visited
Mar. 31, 2001); Taleigh Corp., 119 F.T.C. 835 (1095) (unauthorized debiting of
bank accounts and credit cards; also alleging that it was unfair not to honor a
money-back guarantee and not to deliver purchased product at all or within a
reasonable period of time).
119. One case was more akin to extortion than theft. In FTC v. Amkraut,
Civ. No. 97-0354 RSWL (BZRx) (C.D. Cal. 1997) (consent judgment), an
attorney allegedly submitted "green card" lottery applications and then, when
successful, refused to forward the government-issued case number and
paperwork, but instead dunned consumers to pay additional fees. Complaint
Count II, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/9701/amkrautc.htm>
(visited Mar. 31,2001) (also alleging that the attorney submitted multiple lottery
entries causing some consumers to be rejected from the lottery). Another case
involved simple fraud. The defendant in it was charged with, among other
things, shipping unordered office supplies to businesses and then invoicing the
businesses as though the supplies had been ordered. See FTC v. MTK Marketing,
Inc., Civ. No. 96-230 LHM (EEX) (C.D. Cal. 1996) (settlements), reported at
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/9608/mtk2.htm> (visited Mar. 31,2001). A
similar case is In re Synchronal Corp., 117 F.T.C. 724 (1994), a deception case
that charges that respondents committed unfair acts or practices when, after a
customer ordered a health care product, the respondents would periodically and
without authorization ship additional supplies and bill credit cards. See also 58
Fed. Reg. 32947, 32956 (1993); Complaint 32-39.
120. See FTC v. Crescent Pub'g Group, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
121. See supra note 21.
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extricate themselves. In a world where web sites boast of and
market the number of "hits," the defendant managed to steal the
quite precious commodity, surfer time.1" In another pro ceeding the
Commission challenged as unfair the facilitating of theft through
the sale of customer lists (including credit card information) to
service companies that would make unauthorized charges." InFTC
v. Martinez,"2 the Commission alleged that it was unfair to sell
computerized templates for the creation of fake identification,
which can "facilitate fraudulent activity, including identity theft
and underage drinking."
Several cases involve what are arguably variations of theft or
facilitating theft. Most noteworthy of these are the "cramming"
cases." In FTC v. Hold Billing Services, Ltd,126 defendants allegedly
enticed consumers to enter sweepstakes, providing a telephone
number to permit notification of an award. In fact, the entry forms
were disguised contracts for voicemail services for the submitted
122. See ido This case is discussed further supra, text accompanying notes 21-
22, and infra, text accompanying notes 202-204.
123. See FTC v. Capital Club of North America, Inc., Civ. No. 94-6335
(D.NJ. 1994) reportedathttp://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/95/capitalclubalva.
htm (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
124. Civ. No. 00-12701 CAS (C.D. Cal. 2000) TRO granted Dec. 5, 2000,
available at < http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/martinez.pdf > (visitedMar. 31,
2001). Commissioner Swindle concurred in part and dissented in part from the
issuance of the complaint. He supported the unfairness charge with respect to
underage drinking but expressed reservations about the reference to identity
theft. See Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle Concurring in Part and
Dissenting in Part in Jeremy Martinez, dibla Info World, File No. 0023307,
available at <http://www.ft.gov/os/2000/12/martinez3.htm> (visited Mar.
31, 2001).
125. But cf FTC v. American Telnet, Inc., (S.D. Fla. 1999), stipulatedfinal
judgment, June 10, 1999 ($39 million in consumer redress in "cramming" case);
The Commission defines "cramming" as the placement of unauthorized charges
on telephone bills. See <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9910/websitecramming
testimony.htm> (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
126. Civ. No. SA-98-CA-0629-FB (W.D. Tex. 1999) (stipulated final
judgment Oct. 6, 1999, $1.6 million in consumer redress). See complaint,
available at <www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9906/atncmp.htm> (unfairness not
alleged).
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telephone number; and it is exceedingly difficult to terminate
service."' The complaint had two deception counts and an
unfairness count: billing a line subscriber who had not submitted
the form (for instance, if a child had submitted it) was alleged to be
"unfair" because line subscribers "cannot prevent third parties from
placing their telephone numbers on sweepstakes or price
promotion entry forms."128 Another "cramming" case had three
deception counts and one more problematic unfairness count: it
was alleged to be unfair for a provider of audiotext to let 800-
number callers choose among charging a credit/debit card, debiting
a checking account, or billing the telephone line used to place the
call, because the line subscriber may not have placed or authorized
the call and "[c]onsumers cannot reasonably block telephone calls
to 800 or other toll-free numbers."'" The Commission won a
limited preliminary injunction in FTC v. Verity International,
Ltd,130 against a firm that sold pornographic content through
charges to the telephone line used for the computer connection.
The court ruled "at least at this preliminary stage" that the
Commission was likely to prevail by showing the difficulty of
parents preventing children and others from incurring substantial
unauthorized charges, even though the Commission-recommended
alternative of requiring pre-subscription agreements would harm
defendants.131 The court revealed its ambivalence by its order,
127. See id
128. Complaint 28.
129. Complaint 32, FTC v. Interactive Audiotext Services, Inc., No. CV
98-3049 CBM (BZRx) (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stipulated final judgment filed Dec. 9,
1998, $13 million in consumer redress). See <http://www.ftc.gov/05/1998/
9861/abc.htm >. The same theory is the basis of the unfairness count in FTC v.
International TelemediaAssociates, Inc., Div. No. 1:98-CV-1935 (N.D. Ga. 1998)
(temporary restraining order).
130. 124 F. Supp.2d 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
131. Seeida at 203-04. The court recognized that consumers may benefit from
having an alternative to supplying credit-card information, but suggested that the
real harm to defendants would "be the product of preventing defendants from
capitalizing on the inattention and fear of consumers or on the disparity of
power between them and the persons they bill to extract payments." I
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which required thorough disclosure but not an end to the
challenged billing of telephone lines without advance agreement.
Concepts of theft (not formally, but by analogy) also form the
underlying basis for two of the Commission's controversial cases,
the Touch Tone/Rap 3 "pretexting" case where an information
broker impersonated customers and tricked financial institutions
into disclosing valuable and private financial information,"4 and
FTC v. ReverseAuction.com." The burden on the Commission to
prove (rather than infer) injury was the focus of disagreement in the
Touch Tone/Rapp. The Commission charged that the respondent
was in the business of obtaining confidential financial information
(bank balances and the like) often by making false and misleading
statements to financial institutions (such as by calling up a bank and
pretending to be the customer).36 The complaint alleged that not
only was this deceptive, but the secret selling of such information
was unfair (reciting the three-part test).1 37 Commissioner Swindle,
although pleased that the Commission was bring a wrong-doer to
justice, protested the advancing of what he saw as "a new theory of
consumer injury based solely on the disclosure of 'private' financial
information."3 ' The other three Commissioners (there was one
vacancy) disagreed:
We have previously recognized that the misuse of certain
132. See id This case is further discussed infta text accompanying notes 211-
12.
133. Civ. No. 99-WM-783 (D. Colo. June 27, 2000) (stipulated consent
agreement and final order).
134. These cases are further appraised infta text accompanying notes 200-209.
135. Civil ActionNo. 000032 (D.D.C. 2000) (Stipulated ConsentAgreement
and Final Order) available at <http://www.ft.gov/opa/2000/01/reverse4.
htm>.
136. See Verity International, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
137. See id, complaint at 14-15.
138. Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle in the Matter of Touch
Tone Information, File No. 982-3619 (Apr. 22, 1999) (statement issued when
court complaint was filed, with the matter listed by the name under which
Mr. Rapp was doing business), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/
9904/touchtoneswindlestatement.htm>.
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types of private financial information can be "legally
unfair," In re Beneficial Corp., 86 F.T.C. 119, 173 (1975),
affid in part, remanded on other grounds, 542 F.2d 611 (3d
Cir. 1976). Thus, no new theory of consumer injury is
advanced here. Moreover, the Commission cannot be
precluded from challenging new techniques by dishonest
actors if the act itself satisfies general controlling principles.
For purposes of finding reason to believe a complaint
should be filed, it seems hardly a strain to posit that
substantial consumer injury could flow from the use of false
pretenses to obtain the unauthorized disclosure of private
financial information.139
Commissioner Swindle rejoined that "the concept of 'financial
information' is extremely broad and may be construed to extend
well beyond bank account numbers and balance;"' 40 the case on
which the majority relied was based on a fiduciary relationship, not
on the undermining of one; and that case turned on public policy
considerations that section 5(n) now precludes:
[T]he Commission has not been presented with any
evidence that would create reason to believe that consumers
are likely to suffer substantial injury-i.e., economic harm
or a threat to health or safety-from defendants' actions.
Merely to 'posit' that substantial injury 'could' flow from
the disclosure of private financial information does not
satisfy the statute's requirement ... 141
139. Statement of Chairman Pitofsky and Commissioners Anthony and
Thompson in the Matter of Touch Tone Information, Inc., File No. 982-3619
(April 22, 1999) available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/majority
statement.htm >.
140. Swindle statement, supra note 138.
141. Id at 3. A month after the case was filed it was settled. Commissioner
Swindle issued a shorter dissent in which he expressed pleasure that Congress had
acted to make some (but not all) such pretexting illegal, but continuing to the
complaint as unfounded because (for the unfairness count) "[t~here was no
indication that consumers had suffered substantial injury-i.e, economic harm
1968
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In ReverseAuction.com, 42  the Commission accused
ReverseAuction of obtaining e-mail addresses of eBay users, and
their user names and "feedback ratings," by becoming an eBay user
itself and then breaching the user agreement; ReverseAuction then
allegedly "spammed" the list with highly misleading e-mails. This
was said to be not only deceptive but also unfair.143 The injury
caused, according to Commissioner Thompson (the only member
of the majority to amplify the uninformative complaint) "is a
tangible misappropriation of personal protected information that
enabled the company to send personalized deceptive e-mail
messages to scores of consumers." 1" Commissioners Swindle and
Leary dissented and protested that "[mierely obtaining consumers'
e-mail addresses without their explicit consent and sending them e-
mail solicitations does not cause substantial injury,"14 andprotested
the lack of guidance on when unsolicited e-mail is unfair.
or a threat to health or safety-from defendants' actions." Swindle statement,
supra note 24. The four-Commissioner majority did not respond.
142. See supra note 133.
143. Complaint at 17 C ... ReverseAuction's use of the e-mail addresses,
eBay user IDs, and feedback ratings of eBay registered users for the purposes of
sending unsolicited commercial e-mail, in violation of its agreement to comply
with eBay's User Agreement, is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and therefore was, and is,
an unfair practice.")
144. Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson in
ReverseAuction.com, Inc., File no. 0023046, available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OOO/O1/reversemt.htm>.
145. Statement of Swindle and Leary, ReverseAuction.com, Civil Action
No. 000032 at 2 (Consumers do not have a substantial privacy interest in the e-
mail addresses and other information that ReverseAuction harvested since
consumers had already agreed to make this information available to millions of
other eBay members (albeit with restrictions on using it for commercial
solicitations). Moreover, a substantial portion of this information is available
without restriction to non-members who visit eBay's web site.").
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Z Breaking or Causing the Breaking of Other Laws
Several cases turned on other statutes." The Commission
charged several department stores with unfairness when they
allegedly collected consumer debts that bankruptcy proceedings had
discharged, which violated bankruptcy law because no bankruptcy
court had approved.147 Similarly, in American Family Publishers,'
the Commission charged a magazine seller with unfairness when
the seller approved its debt collection agencies' use of dunning
letters that were clearly unlawful under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. 49
Another example of using unfairness to reach those in control
of an alleged law violator is provided by the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA") cases, which challenged sub-
prime lending practices prohibited by that act.5 Among other
things, the Commission charged lenders with making loans based
on collateral without regard to ability to repay, which is prohibited
by the Act,151 and with including in mortgages a "prepayment
146. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, in theJoe Camel case, In
reR.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9285,1997 FTC LEXIS 1181 (complaint issued
May 28, 1997; dismissed without prejudice Jan. 26, 1999), see supra note 17, the
Commission alleged that an advertising campaign would cause smoking by
persons so young that most states make illegal the sale of tobacco products to
them. In reR.J. Reynolds Complaint, 1997 FTC LEXIS 118, Complaint at 6
& 10.
147. See May Department Stores Co., 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 15 Gan. 20, 1999)
(consent order); Federated Department Stores, Inc., 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 141
(Aug. 20, 1999) (consent order); Montgomery Ward Credit Corp., No. C-3839
(Dec. 11, 1998) (consent order), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9812/9723188.do.htm> (visitedMar. 31,2001);
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 125 F.T.C. 395 (1998) (consent order).
148. 116 F.T.C. 66 (1993) (consent order).
149. 15 U.S.C. S 1692 et seq. (1999).
150. SeeFTC Press Release, July 29,1999, HomeEquityLenders Settle Charges
that They Engaged in Abusive Lending Practices; Over HalfMillion Dollars to be
Returnedto Consumers (summarizing cases), available at < http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/1999/9907/hoepa.htm >.
151. See 15 U.S.C. 5 1639(h); see also 12 C.F.R. S 226.32(e)(1).
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penalty" prohibited by the Act."52 The Commission then alleged
that these lenders and certain officers and directors who directed or
controlled their acts-which individuals could not be reached by
HOEPA-have engaged in unfair acts or practices."53 Although the
defendants settled and the complaints included many counts that
met universal approval, Commissioner Swindle protested that
consumers could easily avoid any harm by simply not taking out a
problematic mortgage, and it was wrong to surmount this hurdle
by relying on the "public policy" of HOEPA because, in his view,
that policy should extend only to the jurisdictional limits
established by Congress."5 4
3. Using Insufficient Care
Other cases seem to echo more in negligence or contracts than
in intentional torts or criminal law. Typical of these is May
Department Stores Co.,"55 a Truth in Lending Act1- case that
included an unfairness count. The Commission charged May
Department Stores, which had run into difficulties in converting
credit accounts that had come to it when it purchased another
retailer, with "fail[ing] to maintain reasonable procedures to
152. See 15 U.S.C. S 1639(c); see also 12 C.F.R. S 226.32(d)(6).
153. See, e.g., FTC v. Granite Mortgage, (E.D. Ky. 1999) complaint filed
July 29, 1999, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/granitecmp.
htm>.
154. Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle Concurring in Part and
Dissenting in Part in the Matters of Granite Mortgage, File No. 982-3167, et al.,
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/swindlestategranite.htm> (If
the underlying actions do not independently violate Section 5 without the
inclusion of HOEPA's "public policy," I do not see how the Commission can
rely on HOEPA's policy to establish that the creditors' actions are unfair but
then disregard the clear limits on HOEPA's applicability by stretching that
policy to cover entities that are not creditors. By doing this, the majority creates
a mechanism to strip a statute of its explicit jurisdictional limits and extend its
reach-as well as that of the Commission-to those whom Congress has
explicitly excluded."). Id
155. 122 F.T.C. 1 (1996) (consent order).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1643; see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(a).
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monitor, measure, or test its open end credit plan account
acquisition, conversion, and maintenance systems to assure the
accuracy of the account information it conveys to consumer
reporting agencies." 117 This was said to be unfair because the three-
part test was met. In Griffln Systems, Inc.,15 the Administrative Law
Judge, in a part of his opinion that was not appealed, found that it
was unfair for the issuer of an extended service contract to require
prior authorization for repairs and then to make it "difficult for
many of these consumers to get through on the telephone lines to
obtain the required authorization." 9 The Judge found "no
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. " "
This kind of unfairness analysis peaked in 1990, when the
Commission issued three unfairness decisions that it did not include
in the list of unfairness cases it submitted to Congress. In Budget
RentA Car Corp.,1 61 the complaint alleged unfairness when a rental
car company did not disclose to customers that it did not promptly
inspect cars subject to recall; in Consumer Direct, Inc.,1 62 the
complaint alleged that it was unfair not to disclose that an exercise
device could break and injure the user; and inJeep Eagle Corp.,163 the
Commission charged an automobile company with unfairness
through breaching warranties by failing to effect successful repairs
reasonably promptly. (Jeep Eagle, now succeeded by first Chrysler
and then Daimler Chrysler, was successor to the ill-fated American
157. 122 F.T.C. at 2, Complaint 12; seealso Analysis of Proposed Consent
Order to Aid Public Comment, 61 Fed. Reg. 19064, 19066 (1996) (The
complaint alleges that respondent's reporting of inaccurate information
constitutes an unfair practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act."). The Complaint at 14, also alleged that it was unfair to
initiate debt collection activity for delinquencies created when Respondent
mistakenly posted payments to wrong accounts.
158. 117 F.T.C. 515 (1994).
159. Id. at 517. The ALJ also found it unfair to unilaterally cancel thousands
of service contracts without a contractual right to do so. See id
160. Id
161. 113 F.T.C. 1109 (1990) (consent order).
162. 113 F.T.C. 923 (1990) (consent order).
163. 113 F.T.C. 792 (1990) (consent order).
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Motors Corporation, which had sold and warranted the cars at
issue.) In Jeep Eagle, the sin was ineptitude: "authorized dealers on
a significant number of occasions failed to repair successfully
automatic transmission fluid or engine oil leaks and related
problems within a reasonable time."1" This breached the warranty
and was unfair because the three-part test was said to be met.16 The
Commission ordered redress of payments of $40 per repair visit,
starting with the fourth visit.1" Commissioner Azcuenaga
dissented, saying without explanation that she lacked reason to
believe the defendant violated a law." Commissioner Machol
dissented from issuance of the proposed settlement (her term had
ended before the final order was issued), arguing that consumer
injury was insubstantial because fewer than one percent of
purchasers had made more than three repair visits, and because the
case involved neither safety, as in International Harvester, or a
unilaterally shifting of costs, as in Orkin. She noted that American
Motors had no incentive to fail at making repairs and that the
Market Place had punished them. 6 Commissioner Strenio
responded that a breach of warranty to 2,000 consumers on a
critical automotive system (the transmission) did cause substantial
injury. 169
4. Interfering with the Exercise of Consumer Rights
Two different kinds of cases involve interference with the
exercise of consumer rights. In The Money Tree, Inc.Y and Tower
Loan of Mississippi71 the Commission charged respondents with
unfairness when they required the purchase of credit insurance in
164. Ia (complaint at 9).
165. See id
166. See id
167. See 54 Fed. Reg. 48681 (1989) (Commissioner Azcuenaga, dissenting).
168. See id. (Commissioner Margot E. Machol, dissenting).
169. See id. (Commissioner Andrew J. Strenio, Jr., concurring).
Commissioner Strenio voted for the final order without issuing a statement.
170. 123 F.T.C. 1187 (1997) (consent order).
171. 115 F.T.C. 140 (1992) (consent order).
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connection with the extension of credit and then required
consumers to execute false statements that the purchase was
voluntary. The allegedly substantial consumer injury, which is not
detailed in the complaint, is presumably the interference with
consumers' ability to challenge the coercive linking of credit and
insurance under the Truth in Lending Act.' 2 Dillard Department
Stores, Inc.73 was principally a Truth in Lending Act case charging
that a department store's erection of hurdles to the removal of
unauthorized charges (notorized affidavits and the like) violated
that act, but the complaint also charged that this practice was
unfair. - That claim may not have had much independent
significance, because after the Federal Reserve Board amended the
official staff commentary to make clear that these practices did not
violate the Truth in Lending Act, the Commission dismissed the
complaint at complaint counsel's request. 4
5. Advertising that Promotes Unsafe Practices
Although at one time challenges to the depiction of unsafe
practices in advertisements was a staple of Commission unfairness
enforcement," s that day has passed. The principal recent example
172. 15 U.S.C. S 1605, 1606 & 1638.
173. No. 9269, 1994 F.T.C. LEXIS 172 (complaint filed Sept. 14, 1994).
174. See 1996 F.T.C. LEXIS 49 (March 7, 1996).
175. See AMF Inc., 95 F.T.C. 310 (1980) (consent order) (unfair method and
practice to show a youth riding a bike over rough ground, turning into an alley
without looking both ways, and entering street a little without stopping and
looking); Mego Int'l, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 186 (1978) (consent order) (unfair method
and practice to show a girl using a child hair dryer near a sink of water without
adult supervision); Uncle Ben's, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 131 (1977) (consent order) (unfair
method and practice to show a child very close to a stove without close adult
supervision); Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 89 F.T.C. 82 (1977) (consent order)
(advertising vitamins to children-here, using Spiderman-is unfair method and
practice because children may over-consume); General Foods Corp., 86 F.T.C.
831 (1975) (consent order) (unfair method and practice to advertise cereal with
a naturalist saying that parts of a pine tree are edible and bush cranberries are
tasty, since it may encourage children to eat plants without supervision).
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of such a challenge is Beck's North America, Inc.,176 in which the
Commission's complaint alleges that it was "unfair" for a
commercial to show young adults without life jackets drinking beer
while sitting on the edge of a schooner bow or standing on a
bowsprit (but not piloting the schooner). The Complaint
thoroughly reviews the risks associated with drinking while
boating, 177 and then recites the three-part test.178 The Analysis to
Aid Public Comment179 does the same and adds ominously, "The
Commission has substantial concern about advertising that depicts
conduct that poses a high risk to health and safety. As a result, the
Commission will closely scrutinize such advertisements in the
future.""S Commissioner Swindle dissented because he believed that
consumers could easily avoid injury simply by having the common
sense not to engage in the "rather stupid and dangerous" activities
portrayed in the commercial."' (His reasoning would suggest with
equal force that the advertisements were unlikely to cause
substantial injury.) The real disagreement is over the burden of
proof the Commission should face when it brings a case-must it
have empirical proof of causation? Both sides avoid this question."
176. No. C-3859, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 40 (1999) (consent order). The only
other examples are tobacco cases. The Joe Camel case, which the Commission
dismissed, emphasized that the questioned advertisements encouraged smoking
by persons too young legally to purchase tobacco products. See supra note 17.
The rotating warnings for cigar cases, seesupra notes 18 & 19, extended principles
settled for cigarettes as a related product.
177. The Coast Guard recommends leaving alcohol on shore. See < http://
www.uscgboating.org/saf/safbui.asp> (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
178. See Beck's North America, 1990 F.T.C. LEXIS 40 (complaint 5)
("Respondent's depiction of this activity in its advertisements is likely to cause
substantial injuryto consumers that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or competition and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers.").
179. See 1998 F.T.C. LEXIS 83 at *14-*15 (1998).
180. Id at *15.
181. Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, DriBeck Importers, Inc.,
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/beckswindle.htm> (visited
Mar. 31,2001).
182. Previous challenges to advertisements in which unsafe behavior is
depicted claimedthat childrenwould beinfluenced. SeeANIF Inc., 95 F.T.C. 310
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B. The Changed FTC Unfairness Jurisprudence Forum for
Adjudication
Classic FTC unfairness jurisdiction was handled
administratively."s The Commission developed its doctrine and
authority through Commission decisions and federal appellate
court review. 184 Indeed, part of the early justification of the FTC's
broad unfairness authority was that it was non-punitive, and could
lead to penalties only after business leaders had been given ample
opportunities to mend their ways.18
This model had started to be weakened by the time Congress
added FTC Section 5(n). Although most of the unfairness cases the
Commission reported to Congress were administrative (including
five litigated cases), the Commission had filed four in federal
court.186 (All ten of the unfairness consent orders the Commission
overlooked were administrative.)"s
The classic model has been further undermined since 1993. No
adjudicated opinion by a Commissioner discusses Section 5(n). 8'
The few adjudicated opinions to address Section 5(n) are by district
(1980) (an unfair method of competition and unfair/deceptive act/practice to
show a child riding a bicycle over rough ground, turning into an alley without
looking both ways, and entering street a little without stopping and looking);
Uncle Ben's, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 131 (1980) (child shown helping to cook and being
close to a stove, which was said to encourage children cook alone and close to
stoves) (alleged to be an unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive
act or practice); General Foods Corp., 86 F.T.C. 831 (1975) (naturalist shown
saying that parts of a pine tree are edible and that bush cranberries and the fruit
of prickly pear cactus are tasty; this was said to encourage children to eat plants
without adult supervision and to be an unfair method and act/practice).
Although it is easy to say that children are easily influenced, however, it would
be exceedingly difficult empirically to prove these kinds of harms.
183. See supra part ]I.
184. See id
185. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 12147 (Remarks of Senator Hollis).
186. See supra notes 93-95.
187. See supra note 97.
188. Cf supra note 99.
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court judges." Even with respect to consent orders, there may be
as many stipulated court judgments as administrative consent
orders.'"
The change is understandable, because the Commission has
slowly developed its authority to bring cases in federal court. 9' In
many ways, federal court offers the best of all possible worlds:
quick, sometimes draconian relief; potentially massive penalties;
and the glamour and elegance of litigating in federal court. Now
that the Commission's authority to bring these cases is well
established, the temptation to bring them is nearly irresistible.'93
Discomfort is caused only because (1) Congress never would have
created a five-member prosecuting authority, (2) there is obvious
possible tension between the breadth of the Commission's
unfairness authority and the imposition of quick, drastic penalties
for violations thereof; and (3) law cannot develop securely without
binding precedents.
189. See FTC v. Crescent Pub'g Group, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); FTC v. Verity International, Ltd., 124 F. Supp. 2d 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
FTC v. J.K. Publications, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(unauthorized debiting of bank accounts unfair); FTC v. Windward Marketing,
Ltd., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17114 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (same).
190. Seesupra part fIM.A. One important and unfortunate difference between
the two is that the Commission does not file an official Analysis to Aid Public
Comment with stipulated court judgments. Commission explanations are
available only if individual Commissioners choose to post comments on the web
(and only for so long as the comment remain posted).
191. SeeStephen Calkins, InPraiseofAntitrustLitigation: TheSecondAnnual
Bernstein Lecture, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1998).
192. See FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564,572 (7th Cir. 1989).
See also FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Gem
Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996); FTC v. Security Rare Coin
& Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).
193. As Commission Leary has written with respect to the Commission's
use of this authority in antitrust cases, "an action of this kind is almost too
expedient and, dare I say, too seductive." Statement of Commissioner Thomas
B. Leary, Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part, FTC v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,FTC File No. X990015, availableat (visitedMar. 23,2001)
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/11/mylanlearystatment.htm>.
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IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The above review of unfairness cases is singularly unsatisfying.
The fact patterns are intriguing and the legal issues challenging, but
in few of the cases are important issues definitively resolved. This
is in part the nature of law-development without much
participation by the courts, but other reasons also contribute.
Ironically, part of the problem is FTC Act Section 5(n). Section
5(n) says that the Commission may not declare unlawful a practice
that does not satisfy the listed standards; it does not say, as the
Commission might wish, that "[an act or practice is unfair if it
'causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which
is not reasonably avoidable...' and so forth.'94 Satisfying the
requirements of FTC Act Section 5(n) is necessary to finding
illegality but is not and should not be sufficient.
Section 5(n) plays out differently in different contexts. The
Commission's standard "unfairness" complaint recites that the 5(n)
criteria are met and a challenged practice is "therefore" unfair and
illegal under Section 5(a) and (n).9' This is proper notice pleading.
Courts should not be similarly casual. More fundamentally, the
Commission, in its private and public deliberations, should not
treat the three-part test as the end of the analysis. It is only the
beginning.
Much of the difficulty stems from the order of the three factors:
injury, unavoidability, and balancing. Analyses tend to follow that
order and invest most heavily in measuring injury. Thus, the
debates in ReverseAuction and Touch Tone/Rapp recounted above196
featured an unsatisfying debate on the extent of consumer injury.
The Commission's 'heavy emphasis on unfairness cases
involving theft and variation thereof suggests that the hard
questions would be answered more authoritatively were the
194. FTC v. Crescent Publishing Group, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
195. See, e.g., Crescent complaint available at
< http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/08/crescent.pdf>.
196. See supra part M.A.1.
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analysis to begin more frequently by balancing costs and benefits.197
The Commission easily condemns theft, extortion, and the like not
because these practices necessarily inflict great harm or because the
harm is unavoidable, but rather because there is no benefit
whatsoever. Any harm outweighs zero benefit, and the cost of
excessive deterrence of actions without benefit is very low
(essentially identification error costs).
Cases involving theft stand in marked contrast to cases
involving advertisements promoting unsafe products and cases
charging insufficient care, categories that have declined
substantially.' Almost by definition, evaluating such cases requires
making complex tradeoffs between costs and benefits.'" Only
rarely will the net effect be sufficiently clear to justify intervention.
That attention to injury is unlikely to resolve hard questions
also is made clear by considering some of the challenging cases the
Commission has confronted or could confront. It is especially
useful to contrast the RappiTouch Tone pretexting cases,2
197. Although analyses tend to start with and overly emphasize injury, that
is not for want of recommendations to highlight balancing, see Gellhorn, supra
note 27; see also Craswell, supra note 27. Neil Averitt has vigorously advocated
a "consumer sovereignty" approach, see Averitt, supra note 30; Averitt & Lande,
supra note 27, which has considerable appeal but fits imperfectly with precedent
and may not resolve the new kinds of controversies the Commission is
confronting.
198. See supra parts lII.A.3 & fIIA.5.
199. With the possible exception of International Harvester, in which the
Commission complained about failing to warn of a dangerous product, the
Commission included no cases charging insufficient care in its 1993 list of
unfairness cases-thereby conspicuously failing to mention the three 1990
examples, see supra, Part IILA.3. of this article. Steps by respondents that would
avoid the harms at issue in those cases-hiring better mechanics, inspecting and
repairing cars more promptly, having more telephone operators, doing a better
job of merging computer systems-inevitably impose costs. The Commission's
1993 list also included no cases in which the Commission challenged
advertisements, and there were no such cases, see supra notes 92-97. Advertising
cases raise intractable questions of benefits (First Amendment values) and proof
of harm (causation).
200. See supra text accompanying note 134.
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ReverseAuction,2 the "pagejacking"/"mouse trapping" case (FTCv.
Pereira),2 and all the mainstream web sites that have started using
pop-up windows to highlight advertisements. 3 In each case, the
Commission could dismiss the harm as unimpressive (and, for the
first two, dissents did so): some personal financial information is
sold, people receive some unrequested e-mail offers, and web surfers
are directed to undesired web sites or are annoyed and waste time
and effort. In none of these situations has a consumer necessarily
lost money or been physically harmed.2" Unless one is prepared to
resolve all these cases for defendants, brooding about injury is
unlikely to help one draw lines.
Approaching the fact patterns by focusing on costs and benefits
is more promising."' (Some attention to harms is obviously
necessary before costs can be contrasted with benefits; the
suggestion is merely to appraise both, and the balance, early in the
process, rather than lingering too long on precise measuring of
injury.) Pop-up windows, for instance, offer potential benefits to
web sites and advertisers, and thus indirectly to viewers. They may
directly benefit viewers who choose to participate in the
promotion. Market forces minimize harms: established sites will
not unduly offend viewers; displeased viewers can vote with their
mice by exiting, and promotions that offend will not work. There
is no need for Government to intervene even if technological
advances will not block pop-up windows. In contrast, mouse
trapping offers few benefits. The web sites benefit, to be sure, but
when they capture viewers for extended periods there is no
reassurance that viewers benefit or that the impositions are modest
and controllable. Mouse trapping is less like conventional
201. See supra text accompanying note 133.
202. See supra text accompanying note 21.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 13 & 14.
204. In its "pagejacking" complaint, the Commission alleged that employees
were directed to adult sites that violated employer policies and that children were
misdirected to inappropriate adult sites. See Complaint 26.
205. The discussions that follow are based only on hypothesized costs and
benefits, since even where there are decisions, analysis is very limited. The point
is to suggest thinking, not to draw conclusions.
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advertising than the heavy-handed automobile sales representative
who will not return a customer's keys. One can see, based on
intuition and analysis, that it can be stopped without jeopardizing
proconsumer activity.
Pretexting (Rapp/Touch Tone) and ReverseAuction also can be
usefully compared. Unless the caller is in law enforcement or quasi-
law enforcement, 6 it is hard to see the benefit from letting callers
impersonate consumers and trick banks into providing account
information. The potential harms are many: to the consumer
whose information is subsequently sold, but also to the bank that
bears consumers' wrath and has to invest resources in preventing
such deceptions, and to consumers who, frustrated by such
enhanced security, are unable to learn information that is
legitimately theirs. Those harms necessarily outweigh the non-
existent benefits of wide-scale pretexting. (ustifications limited to
special situations would apply only to those situations.)
ReverseAuction °7 is trickier. With pretexting, it is wrong simply
for the respondent to obtain the information, and harm can flow
therefrom. In ReverseAuction, the information in question (e-mail
addresses and rating information of participants) was freely
available."' The wrong, if any, was only in using it in ways
inconsistent with eBays' contract; yet there is no special reason why
a private contract represents public good. Many breaches of private
contracts that would benefit the public.2 9 Indeed, one can imagine
that learning about a potentially better auction service could be a
benefit. At best, there is an uncertain balance between costs and
benefits, which suggests that was the weakest of the cases.
206. Cf Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle in Touch
Tone Information, File No. 982-3619 (une 27, 2000), available at (visited Mar.
31, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/touchtoneswindle.htm>
(dissenting from pretexting settlement and noting that Congress had acted to bar
pretextingin some but not all circumstances (pretexting is permittedto aid in the
collection of child support payments)).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 134 & 142-144.
208. See id
209. See, eg., Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus
cEfficient)Breach: Theory andEmpirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL. STUD. 131 (1999).
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Emphasizing costs and benefits makes clearer the proper
resolution of other cases, as well. The Commission properly
brought C&D,21" the consent order attacking the sale of cable
system decoders, because the only benefit was in permitting
consumers to intercept signals and free ride on the payments of
others. Hold Billing Services,"' the cramming case in which an
apparent sweepstakes entry in fact caused services to be charged to
telephone bills, was an easy case because there was no benefit to the
practice. The Verity International"' cramming case is a much
trickier unfairness case (it may be an easy deception case) because
there are court-recognized benefits to letting people purchase
audiotext services without using a credit card.2' Those benefits may
be outweighed by the harms, but the Commission can achieve
clarity most quickly by beginning the analysis by focusing on those
benefits and the balancing thereof-and by refraining from relying
on a too-simple invocation of the three-part test.
A. An Example
An example of how to identify a good unfairness case, by doing
more than merely reciting the three-part test, might be helpful.
Consider FTC v. MTKMarketing, Inc.214 Defendants allegedly make
telephone calls pretending to be a customer's usual supplier of
photocopier toner and offer to rush some toner to the customer
before a price increase.215 Thereafter, defendants would send
additional (unordered) shipments pretending as though the
customer had ordered them, and submitting bills for these
210. See supra text accompanying notes 115 -17.
211. See supra text accompanying note 126.
212. See Verity International, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 203 n.58 ("There probably
also are consumers who benefit from defendants' service by concealing the nature
of their on-line activities from others by means of the deceptive bills.").
213. See supra text accompanying notes 130-132.
214. See supra note 119.
215. Seeid
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shipments.21 The Commission alleged this to be unfair,21 and with
good reason.
* The practice confers few if any cognizable benefits. Except that
defendants profited, a benefit which the Commission and courts
should not recognize,"' the practice has no social utility.
216. See U
217. See id. (Complaint Count V).
218. The Commission has not been entirely consistent in its calculating of
apractice's benefits. Some particular costs (to respondents) appear to be excluded
altogether; the gain from defrauding consumers cannot be balanced, dollar for
dollar, against consumer losses. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. at 364-
65 (consumer cost of an increased charge not offset by seller's gain). In C&D
Electronics, Chairman Oliver, supporting the decision, said that the gain to
consumers free-riding on the payments of others should be disregarded. See C&D
Electronics, In., 109 F.T.C. at 80 (Separate Statement of Chairman Daniel
Oliver). In Griffin Systems, the ALJ found no countervailing benefits when
Respondent made it difficult to get through on a telephone line to obtain
authorization for repairs, seesupra notes 157-159 and accompanying text, thereby
presumably ignoring any savings in expense to Respondent.
Other cases suggest more willingness to consider expenses born by affected
private parties. International Harvester explicitly recognized that the "principal
tradeoff" is "compliance costs," which "are ultimately born as higher prices."
International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1065. The Commission's analysis of the
Credit Practice Rule squarely examined the costs being imposed on creditors:
"To the extent that the remedies that the rule prohibits reduce the cost of
business for creditors, borrowers as a group benefit from those remedies through
greater availability of credit and lower interest rates. However, the Commission
believes the overall costs to consumers are greater than these benefits." Credit
Practices Rule, supra text accompanying note 33. In the Statement of Basis and
Purpose for the Funeral Rule, the Commission justified requiring itemized
pricing not by saying that the greater expense was irrelevant, but rather by
concluding that "the increased costs caused by switching to itemization... are
modest and outweighed by the far greater benefits expected by increased price
competition and greater consumer choice." Funeral Rule Statement of Basis and
Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260 (1982); see also supra note
79. The Commission similarly justified the Used Car Rule. See Trade Regulation
Rule Concerning the Sale of Used Motor Vehicles, Statement of Basis and
Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg. 45692 (1984). ("The only arguable
countervailing benefit to consumers or competition produced by a dealer's
failure to disclose warranty terms in a timely manner would be that dealers can
avoid the exceedingly small cost of disclosure."); see also amendment to Trade
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Defendants must expend resources to participate in the scheme, so
this is not a case where defendants are minimizing costs.
* There is substantial injury (which, of course, is an essential
consideration). Even if defendants do not trick customers into
accepting the product, customers incur expenses to return (or
reassure themselves they need not).19
Regulation Rule concerning Care Labeling of Textile Wearing, Apparel and
Certain Piece Goods, 48 Fed. Reg. 22733 (1983) (expense of a care labeling
program outweighed by benefits).
Other Commission decisions are ambiguous. The Commission's explanation
of the Mail Order Rule finessed the issue as follows:
Finally, the harm to consumers is not outweighed by any
corresponding benefits to consumers or merchants. There is no
reason to believe that there are legitimate benefits to merchants
from unilaterally changing contract terms or breaching
contracts or that consumers benefit through lower prices or
better quality from such practices. Indeed, unsatisfactory
experiences can deter consumers from ordering by telephone
from other merchants who would ship on time or properly
notify them of delays... . Prompt shipment and timely,
proper notifications of delay are low cost, good business
practices that encourage repeat sales
Trade Regulation concerning mail or telephone order Merchandise statement of
basis and purpose Regulatory analysis, 58 Fed. Reg. 19096 (1993).
The District Court in Crescent Publishing Co., 129 F. Supp. at 322, referred
to the number of satisfied customers as though that might be a defense (that was
not large enough in that particular case). This is too vague; the mere fact that
some consumers are content cannot justify a practice unless the practice is
necessary to the contentment. But expenses borne by businesses are real
expenses, and the thinking of International Harvester the Credit Practices Rule
ought to be made definitive.
219. For all the attention given it, ambiguity exists with respect to proving
consumer injury. One question is whether all injuries count, or whether some
count more than others. The 1980 Statement spoke as follows: "The
Commission is not concerned with trivial or merely speculative harms. In most
cases a substantial injury involves monetary harm .... Unwarranted health and
safety risks may also support a finding of unfairness. Emotional impact and other
more subjective types of harm, on the other hand, will not ordinarily make a
practice unfair." 1980 Unfairness Statement, supra note 6, 104 F.T.C. at 1073
(footnotes omitted). Some Commissioners seem to equate "substantial injury"
with economic harm or risk to health or safety. Statement of Commissioner
1984
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e The scheme has elements of deception. No bright line separates
unfairness and deception; both concepts originally traveled in the
same vessel. ' Although there are exceptions, most unfairness cases
have involved elements of deception, and the need for government
intervention is most apparent when companies deceive
consumers.2
1
* Thepracticeharmslegitimatecompetitors by diverting orders to
the unscrupulous. Congress's original concept of unfairness turned
in significant part on protecting legitimate competition, and the
Orson Swindle in the Matter of Touch Tone Information, File No. 982-3619
(Apr. 22, 1999) ("[T]he Commission has not been presented with any evidence
that would create reason to believe that consumers are likely to suffer substantial
injury-ie., economic harm or a threat to health or safety-from defendants'
actions."). Other Commission statements elevate monetaryharm especially high.
See 1982 Letter, supra note 6. ("[The Commission believes its concerns should
be with substantial injuries; its resources should not be used for trivial or
speculative harm. As a general Proposition, substantial injury involves economic
or monetary harm and does not cover subjective examples of harm such as
emotional distress or offenses to taste or social belief."). Nothing in the statute,
however, limits consumer harm to money or health/safety, and even
Commissioners eager to concentrate on money or health and safety may not
absolutely exclude other injuries. See Statement of Commissioners Orson
Swindle and Thomas B. Leary, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part in
ReverseAuction.com, Inc., File No. 0023046, available at
<http://www.ft.gov/os/200O/O1/reversesl.htm> ("We do not say that
privacy concerns can never support an unfairness claim."). What is unclear is
which injuries count most, how much more than others some injuries count,
how directly consumers must be harmed, and what it means (for these purposes)
to harm competition.
Also uncertain is the critical question: How precisely must the Commission
prove its case? Without being permitted to draw reasonable inferences, the
Commission could not function, cf Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.2d 783, 788
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding Commission inference that was not "irrational");
but courts will not let the Commission decide cases by making up inferences as
it goes along. See California Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). This was the
dispute that divided the Commissioners inRapp/ToucbTonesupra notes 133-141
and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
221. See Am. Financial, 767 F.2d at 979 n. 27 (quoting this distinction); see
also Craswell, supra note 27).
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Wheeler-Lea Amendment did not change this.m Although the
modem Commission has treated consumer unfairness separately as
a matter of practice, there is no bar to the Commission's
acknowledging the historic roots of the ban on "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices."m
o The practice is clearly wrong. The FTC should not condemn
any business practice as "unfair" unless it is clearly wrong. Today,
no one would suggest that immorality is a sufficient reason for the
FTC to intervene, even if Congress permitted this. Surely,
222. For most of the Commission's existence, neither the Commission nor
the courts had any trouble condemning a host of practices currently labeled
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" as "unfair methods of competition." See
supra part II. The Wheeler-Lea Amendments did little to end this practice. The
distinction became important after Magnuson-Moss Rulemaking was authorized,
since that was limited to "acts or practices," and, indeed, the Commission was
accused of miscategorizing some traditional "methods of competition" in order
to invoke that authority. See, e.g., Michael L. Denger, The Unfairness Standard
and FTC Rulemaking: The Controversy over the Scope of the Commission's
Authority, 49 ANTIMUST L.J. 53 (1980). Nonetheless, a casual review of FTC
Reports reveals even routine advertising cases being brought as both "methods"
and "acts/practices" until about 1986. Even in proceedings pending much later
than that, however, and even in the rule-making context, the Commission has
noted that what it is calling an unfair act or practice may also "harm
competition." See Mail Order Rule, supra note 96 (noting that "unsatisfactory
experiences can deter consumers from ordering by telephone from other
merchants who would ship on time or properly notify them of delays").
223. Supra text accompanying notes 47-55. More questionable would be the
Commission's resort to its ability to outlaw "unfair methods of competition" to
attack practices clearly on the consumer protection side of the divide, and thus
seek to avoid the S 5(n) limitations. Congress's restriction only on the
Commission's ability to find an unfair "act or practice" but not an unfair
"method of competition" raises the intriguing but probably mischievous
question of whether the Commission would have more flexibility were it to
challenge some activity as an unfair "method of competition." The text of the
legislation clearly applies only to "acts and practices," not to "methods of
competition." If one is allowed to peek beyond language even a little, however,
one is confronted with reasonably clear evidence that Congress thought "unfair
methods of competition" would be identified largely through use of antitrust
precedents and posed little threat of swallowing all FTC "unfairness." See supra
text accompanying note 77.
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however, it is a necessary condition to Commission action that the
practice fits within the ordinary meaning of "unfair": "contrary to
laws or conventions, esp. in commerce; unethical";' 4 or "dishonest,
dishonorable, or unethical in business dealings."2 s Normal
meanings of statutory words are, after all, the usual starting point
for interpretation. 6 Before a practice is condemned as unfair, one
ought to be able to explain crisply why it is wrong," and overtime
Commission precedent should help to delineate such practices."
9 The practice is designed to exploit human weakness. The
defendants in MTK knew that people have poor memories, keep
imperfect records, avoid unnecessary work, and are imperfectly
informed about legal rights and remedies. They designed their
scheme to exploit these weaknesses. Unfairness cases going back as
far as R.F. Keppel have been concerned with exactly that. 9
* There is persuasive precedent for condemning the challenged
practice. One of the grand original missions of the FTC was to shed
light on business practices and develop a jurisprudence that
distinguished fair from unfair." The Commission can accomplish
this only if attention is paid to precedent. The Commission has
224. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1474 (3d ed. 1993)
(second definition; first is "not just or evenhanded; biased").
225. WEBSTR'SNEWWORLDDICTIONARYOFTHEAMERICANLANGUAGE
1550 (2d ed. 1982) (second definition; first is "not just or impartial; biased;
inequitable").
226. Cf Keppel, 291 U.S. at 313 ("It would seem a gross perversion of the
normal meaning of the word, which is the first criterion of statutory
construction, to holdthat the [break and take] method is not 'unfair."') (citations
omitted); seesupra part TI.A (Congressional desire to address wrongful practices).
227. This is another reason why mere "unreasonableness" will rarely be
"unfair." Few practices are clearly wrong if they are wrong only as qualified.
Congress's focus was on specific methods of competition and on specific acts and
practices. Deliberately mislabeling wool was an unfair method of competition,
see FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922); using too little care in
knitting almost certainly was not.
228. Cf supra text accompanying notes 29 & 54-55 (traditional case law
setting out the Commission's calling as a developer of standards).
229. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
230. See supra part I1.
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been concerned with unordered merchandise since early days,23
and this concern is evidenced in legislation 22 and rule-making.13
The above list of considerations is intended only as an
illustration. Not every listed consideration is essential: a good
unfairness case might lack elements of deception, or not harm
legitimate competitors. The considerations are offered as examples
of the kind of thinking in which the Commission ought to engage
as it wrestles with its historic mandate to identify unfair acts and
practices, whether through traditional administrative adjudication
or through other means.
B. The Needfor Administrative Adjudication
From the beginning, defenders of "unfairness" jurisdiction
sought to mollify critics by pointing to the special, non-punitive
nature of the FTC." Senator Hollis pointed out that businesses
would have three chances to show that they were doing nothing
wrong: first in informal negotiations with the Commission, then in
a Commission hearing, and finally on appeal." Only then would
penalties follow from continued misbehaving. Similarly, in the
Companion Statement to its 1980 Unfairness Statement, the
Commission reassured observers by suggesting that a firm engaging
in a "newly identified unfair act or practice" normally could expect
little more than a prospective order to cease and desist. 6
231. See Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. at 354 n. 4 (1941) (Commission-provided
examples of unfair competition included "[s]hipping products at market prices
to its customers or prospective customers.. .without an order and then inducing
... the consignees to accept and purchase consignments.").
232. See 36 U.S.C. § 3009 (1983) (mailing of unordered merchandise).
233. See Mail Order Rule, supra note 96. One should be wary, however, of
excessive reliance on the precedential value of consent orders. A consent order
may signify nothing more than that a respondent lacked the resources or
inclination to resist. Principles erected on consent orders are grounded in sand
and cannot (and should not) bear much weight.
234. See supra part mI.B.
235. See supra note 185.
236. See Companion Statement on the Commission's Consumer Unfairness
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In a story told elsewhere, the FTC has moved away from
administrative adjudication The Commission now files the vast
majority of its cases in federal court." There are legitimate reasons
for preferring a court proceeding, especially where the wrong is
obvious and the need for relief is pressing. There are also
illegitimate reasons, such as the perceived glamor of litigating "real"
courts and the development of marketable court litigating skills.
One unfortunate factor driving Commission staff to federal court
has been the belief that Commission adjudication does not work.
The Commission needs to make adjudication work and be
perceived by agency personnel and others as working. The agency
has taken steps to make this happen"' but the task is almost
Sisyphean and requires continuing attention. All the incentives are
Jurisdiction (Dec. 12, 1980), reprinted at TRADE REG. REP. (CC) [CuRRENT
COMMENT 1969-1983 TRANSFER BINDER] 50,421 at 55,953-94 (footnotes
omitted):
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, businesses cannot be
subjected to sanctions for engaging in an unfair practice until the
practice has been defined with specificity in a full-dress adjudication or
rulemaking. If, in an adjudication, a firm is found to have engaged in a
newly identified unfair act or practice, civil penalties are not assessed;
rather, the remedies are limited to preventing the firm from engaging in
the same or related practices in the future, and, in appropriate cases, to
providing relief for injured parties. Only if the order is violated may
penalties then be assessed. There are also some special provisions for
immediate consumer redress, but these pply only to conduct that "a
reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was
dishonest or fraudulent," and that determination must be made in
federal court.
237. See Calkins, supra note 191; Report of theAmerican BarAss'n Section of
Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade
Commission, 58 ANTITRUST LJ. 43, 161-62 (1989) (data showing dramatic shift
in work years from administrative litigation to court proceedings).
238. The two pending proceedings chronicled in the most recent
Adjudicative Status Report, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/
status010101.pdf>, stand in stark contrast to the lengthy list of court
proceedings included in the Commission's federal court litigation status report,
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/status/toc.htm >.
239. See Calkins, supra note 191.
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the wrong way. With a mandate as imprecise as "unfairness,"
however, administrative adjudication must be a viable option for
complaint counsel and prospective defendants alike.'
Effective adjudication is needed in part to permit the law to
develop though precedent and court review; indeed, the
Commission was created in part to build up a body of precedent. 41
Compare, for instance, the Commission's thoughtful wrestling
with "unfairness" quandaries in Orkin' and International
Harvester24' with the inevitably cursory treatment the questions
received in FTC v. J.K Publications.2" It is unfortunate that no
court of appeals has reviewed a Commission unfairness decision
since 1988. It is unfortunate that understandings of Commission
"unfairness" standards must be drawn principally from consent
orders entered without benefit of the crucible of adjudication. Law
cannot develop, as law, without litigated disagreements, appellate
review, and the discipline of applying principles to facts while
creating binding precedent. Indeed, it has long been understood that
the meaning of "unfairness" "must be arrived at by... 'the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.' 24
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Trade Commission understandably shies away
from filing consumer unfairness cases. The agency's bold
exploration of this authority had devastating consequences. With
the passage of time and changing circumstances, however, the
Commission is again exercising this power. As the Commission
does so, it should emphasize the weighing of costs and benefits as
240. See ABA SpecialReport, supra note 237, at 121 ("Particularly for these
rather vague legal standards, there can be virtue in the consistency that can be
generated by administrative adjudication.").
241. See supra text accompanying note 29.
242. 108 F.T.C. 263.
243. 104 F.T.C. 949.
244. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176.
245. Keppel, 291 U.S. at 312 (quoting Raladam, 283 U.S. at 648).
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much as or more than merely the measurement of injury. This
balancing process helps explain recent agency decisions, most of
which have involved allegations of theft and the facilitation thereof,
and separate the hard from the easy cases. Analysis must go beyond
the simple recitation of the three-part test in FTC Act Section 5(n),
and would benefit greatly from the careful attention possible
through administrative adjudication.
